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I. INTRODUCTION

. 1. General Introduction
This paper considers legal tax avoidance or planning through the
use, manipulation or interpretation of legal concepts (legal terms)
resulting in reduced tax liability.' Legal terms can be used for tax
1. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 3
HANDBOOK OF PUB. ECON. 1423, 1428 (2002); Joel Slemrod, A General Model of the Behavioral
Response to Taxation, 8 INT'L TAX AND PUB. FIN. 119, 119 (2001); MICHAEL BROOKS & JOHN
HEAD, TA AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 71 (Graeme S. Cooper ed., 1997); see, e.g., David

A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627,
1629 (1999); NABIL OROW, GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES: A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL

ANALYSIS 329 (2000); JAMES KIRKBRIDE & ABIMBOLA A. OLOWOFOYEKU, THE LAW AND THEORY
OF INCOME TAX 339-40 (2002). For other kinds and definitions of tax avoidance and planning, see
Graeme S. Cooper, TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 24-36 (Graeme S. Cooper ed., 1997);
OROW, supra, at 2-12, 18-45; VICTOR THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW 150, 152-53, 155-56,
178 (2003); DAVID GLIKSBERG, THE BOUNDARIES OF TAX PLANNING 27 (1990); ARYE LAPIDOTH,
EVASION AND AVOIDANCE OF INCOME TAX: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ENGLISH LAW AND

ISRAELI LAW 131-47 (1966); George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and
ControllingIncome Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 659 (1985); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax
Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 369, 440-43,445-47 (1988); David A.
Weisbach, Costs of DeparturesFrom Formalism: Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
860, 880-81 (1999); David A. Weisbach, CorporateTax Avoidance 2, 8-9 (The U. of Chicago Law
Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 202, 2004), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_201-25/202-daw-avoidance.pdf.
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avoidance if they change tax liability. Tax impact may be generated by
legal terms defined under tax law such as "income" and "business
expenses" or by general law terms naming different incorporation forms
and various property and contract rights.
Tax practitioners may note that "it is important not to let the tax tail
wag the commercial dog, ' 2 - not to let tax avoidance considerations
interfere with economic decision-making. The extent to which jurists
can reduce taxes without interfering with economic activities represents
a gap between legal terms and actual economic activity. This gap may
be a source of difficulty for the interpretation and application of tax law,
as shown through the economic substance doctrine.3 This gap is
manifested in the economic, rather than legal, definition of tax
avoidance. Economic tax avoidance, as implied by the definitions of
"excess burden" and "efficiency," occurs when an individual or firm
(hereinafter "person") changes consumption or production decisions in
response to taxation.4 Given the juristic goal of not affecting the
economic reality and the contradicting economic definition, we note that
this gap creates a theoretical problem.
Continental linguistic and semantic theory, which this paper
examines, 5 has developed tools to help us analyze such gaps between
legal terms and the real application of language. It uses the trichotomy
of signifier, signified and referent. To this trichotomy we will add an
integrative approach to the notion of "concepts," used by Depecker, Rico
and others. 6 The resulting four-faceted distinction roughly correlates to
juristic thoughts about language, legal terms and positive reality. This
distinction will be used throughout the paper, first to offer a new
variation on the definition of the tax-base concept.
2.

1 TOLLEY'S TAX PLANNING 1(I992).

3. OROW, supra note 1, at 329; Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 5, 7-12 (2000); Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and
the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 231-39 (2000); David Hariton, Sorting out the Tangle of
Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW 235, 236-241 (1999); GLIKSBERG, supra note 1,at 4; Alexandra
M. Walsh, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax Shelters, Practical Reason and the
New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1544 (2001).
4. Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 1, at 1428; ALAN J. AUERBACH & JAMES R. HINES JR., 3
HANDBOOK OF PUB. ECON. 1347, 1348-89 (2002).
5. For different views of semantics, reference and linguistics, see, for example, GEOFFREY
LEECH, SEMANTICS: THE STUDY OF MEANING (1974); Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of
Judging, 54 S.CAL. L. REV. 151, 168-69 (1981).
6. Loic Depecker, Saussure et le concept, BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE DE LINGUISTIQUE DE
PARIS 53 (2003); Christophe Rico, La Langue, ajardin clos, source scelceo. Saussure et le Cours
de Linguistique Gndrale, Cent Ans Aprds, 14 ACTA PHILOSOPHICA I 35, 44-48 (2005) (It.);

Christophe Rico, Le Signe ((domaineferm&: Saussure et le Cours de Linguistique Gdnrale, Cent
Ans Aprns, 144 REVUE DE POETIQUE 387, 390 (2005) (Fr.).
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Linguistic theory has also shown that every language and every
word with a semantic function analyzes and "covers" different aspects of
reality and is affected by context, ambiguity,7 and partial synonymy.8
We will relate this theory - and its application for language usage
(speech, or parole in French) - to Hart's theory of the "open texture" of
law and legal vagueness 9 and will use it to explain some facets of tax
avoidance, anti-avoidance rules and interpretation. Notably, we will
explain the paradox of the too-accurate tax rules.' 0
This paper will claim that tax terms show the characteristics of an
anti-communicative language with accelerated evolution." This is to
say tax law creates a domain in which legislators and interpreters face
both an ever-changing language and legal terms that are constantly
13
12
moving toward meaning extension and ambiguity (or polysemy).
The semantic application and extension of tax terms are in constant
dispute. This is because taxpayers have a persistent interest in using
language inaccurately and in miscommunicating (in a civil way criminal law will not be discussed here) their economic activities and
wealth to tax authorities and courts. Under this analysis, the usual force
of formal and authoritative "definitions" of legal terms is weaker for tax
law. 14 Behind this weakening stands the linguistic claim that language
evolution, and for our purposes semantic evolution, is in the hands of the

7. For ambiguity, see LEECH, supra note 5, at 67-69, 78-79.
For a definition of "synonymy," see IRPNE TAMBA-MECZ, LA SEMANTIQUE 79-85 (1988)
(Fr.) ("Synonymie.- Dans rusage courant, on appelle synonymes, des mots de forme diffrrente mais
de sens identique ou semblable et de meme statut morphosyntaxique). See also OSWALD DUCROT
8.

& JEAN-MARIE SCHAEFFER, NOUVEAU DICTIONNAIRE ENCYCLOPEDIQUE DES SCIENCES Du
LANGAGE 398 (1995).
9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
10. For different claims against the "too-exact" legal language, see LAWRENCE M. SOLAN,
THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 188 (1993).
11. For a contradicting claim, according to which legal terms suffer the same amount of

application problems as regular words, see SOLAN, supra note 10, at 132.
12. For a contradicting conclusion about the low amount of ambiguous terms in law in general
(opposing our conclusion about tax-law), see BERNARD S. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL
THEORY 41-42 (1985) (reporting the results of J. L. SOURIOUX AND P. LARET, LE LANGAGE DU
DROIT (1976)). For some demonstrations of ambiguity in law, see Glanville Williams, Language
and The Law - II., 61 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 179, 179-81 (1946).
13. DUCROT & SCHAEFFER, supra note 8, at 399. OSWALD DUCROT & TZVETAN TODOROV,
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE SCIENCES OF LANGUAGE 236-37 (1979) ("[W]e shall speak of
polysemy rather than ambiguity when relatively general laws allow passage from one meaning to
another and allow us to foresee the variation.").
14. YON MALEY, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 22-23 (John Gibbons ed., 1994). For an account

of the mix of English and legal language in statutes, see DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF
THE LAW 10-29 (1963).
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speaking masses. Indeed, one person can use language wrongly,15 but a
continuous and persistent "misuse" is not a misuse, but rather language
evolution.1 6 The existence of this accelerated evolution gives linguistic
tools many descriptive and analytic capabilities for the analysis of tax
law.
Tax law places much emphasis on legal terms and institutions used
by taxpayers. 17 These legal terms are not identical to economic
concepts. Due to this difference, the use of these terms entails an act of
"translation" between law and economics, a translation that opens the
door to avoidance opportunities18 and entails anti-avoidance doctrine.' 9
This paper claims that the economic perspective on reality may miss
some of the relevant phenomena.
The paper touches upon and helps explain the concepts and
phenomena of the tax base, the audit, tax complexity and accuracy, tax
interpretation and reinterpretation, tax avoidance, distributive effects of
tax avoidance, legitimacy of tax avoidance, taxation through general
versus tax-specific legal terms, and more. It joins juristic analyses of
dynamic tax law and research to the effects of tax avoidance on tax
law. 20 The new theory and results it posits come largely from linguistic
analysis.
12. A Commentfor Economists
Semantics and microeconomics are based on different perspectives
of reality. For semantics, there is one reality, but it has many
21
For microeconomics, agents can choose between
descriptions.
alternative real courses of action, and the description is not important.
15. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURS DE LINGUISTIQUE GENERALE 36, 104-08 (tdition
Payot 1969) (Fr.). This book is a printed edition, by professors Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye,
of lectures given by de Saussure in the years 1907-1911.
16. Id. at 108-13.
17. See, for example, different income-tax-rules applied to different types of corporations and
to natural persons (e.g. I.R.C. § 112). The economic substance doctrine mentioned above, and its
likes, are the exceptions that prove the rule.
18. For the claim that tax avoidance "results from the difficulty of giving legal expression to
economic concepts," see J. FELDMAN & J. A. KAY, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 320 (Paul
Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981).
19. E.g., the "business purpose doctrine" of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465,469 (1935).
20. Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267,
1275-79 (1990).
21. One can learn this from Whorfs idea that the lexicon of each language analyzes reality
differently. Infra Part IV.6 ("Semantics and Analytical Indeterminacy (Choice of Analysis)"). One
can also learn this from the claim that one "notion" (or "concept") can be embedded into different
signifieds in different languages, or within the same language. Rico, supra note 6, at 46-48.
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Semantics concentrates on the subject's choice of descriptions (of states
of the world and events), while microeconomics concentrates on his
choice of behavior.
The semantic perspective fits the jurist model of tax planning that
does not interfere with economic activity but rather with its legal
description. The microeconomic reduction entails the definition of tax
avoidance as the effect of taxes on behavior. Each of these two
perspectives may be useful for the study of tax-law avoidance and
interpretation in different situations. This is the case if taxpayers react to
taxation by changing the description of their activities, as well as their
actual activities, in order to minimize taxation. Using both perspectives,
one notices that the two types of reactions may reinforce each other. For
example, when semantic extension and vagueness enable taxpayers to
avoid taxes, they may just rename actions they would have taken
anyway (renaming that results in distributive effects). Even so, they
may not be satisfied; taxpayers may also increase activities describable
under such vagueness, thus creating economic inefficiencies.
The academic or policy utility of each perspective depends on the
general effects and the frequency of each avoidance technique. Keep in
mind that each perspective focuses our attention on specific things and
disregards others. An occasional switch may improve our understanding
of reality.
II. LEGAL AND LINGUISTIC CONCEPTS
ILl. Signifier, Signified, Concept, and Referent
Saussure (Cours de Linguistique G6n6rale - CLG) divided the term
"sign" into "signifier" and "signified., 22 Linguists who claimed they
followed Saussure felt compelled to introduce the "referent" into the
definition of the sign. 23 Saussurian linguistics 24 explains these notions
as follows: a "signifier" is an acoustic image 25 (that may be represented
by a mark on paper or screen); 26 a "signified" is the reduction of a
22. SAUSSURE, supra note 15, at 99.
23. See TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 70-74. For the definition of the concept "sign," see
also DUCROT & SCHAEFFER, supra note 8, at 216. For a short comparison of some North American
and European approaches to the "referent" concept, see JACKSON, supra note 12, at 14-17.
24. For that approach and others, see DUCROT & SCHAEFFER, supra note 8, at 302-06;
TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 71-73.
25. For problems related to the definition of "linguistic units" and for use of words as
inaccurate proxies, see SAUSSURE, supra note 15, at 26, 148, 158.
26. For an approach that finds the uttered word central and the written word as means towards

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol23/iss1/2
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concept (or notion) into a specific language, or more accurately, a
semiotization of a notion in a specific language (here we follow
Depecker and Rico); 27 a "referent" is what is pointed at by a sign: it may
be a specific real-world phenomenon,
an abstract reality or entity, a legal
28
right, or a fictional reality.
For example, when we hear the signifier "pillow," our mind is led
to conjure the signified "pillow," which belongs to the English language.
Based on the context, this signified will "refer" to pillows in general or
to a specific pillow, such as one located in the house of one of this
paper's authors.
In using the trichotomy of signifier, signified and referent, this
paper takes into account its properties and difficulties. When we hear
the word "pillow" we can identify the signifier rather accurately,
according to our knowledge of the English language.
There are certain problems with the terms "referent" and "concept."
When the word "pillow" refers to that specific pillow in the author's
home, it is uncommunicative for anyone who has not been to the
author's home. This first problem also affects taxation, since we would
like to levy taxes according to specific states of reality.
The second problem is more complex. Take the following two
examples: the concept "pillow" is a psychological phenomenon that may
not completely correspond with the way this notion has been
semiotisized as a signified in different languages.
Taking Rico's
example,29 the signified of "pillow" in French ("oreiller") is related to
"ear" ("oreille"). In Arabic, however, a pillow ("mikhadda") is related
to "cheek" ("khadd"). One can see that the French signified and the
Arabic signified, while semitisizing the same concept, have different
linguistic values: each word relates differently to other words in its
respective language (see more for linguistic value in Part IV.2,
hereinafter).
For a second and more abstract demonstration, compare the
signified of "policy" in English to the signified of "politique"in French,
in relation to the notion of "policy." In English, the signified of "policy"
contrasts with the signified of "politics," stressing the difference

it, see id., at 45, 58.
27. For discussion and critique of this approach, see Depecker, supra note 6, at 7 1-100; Rico,

supra note 6, at 44-48, and references.
28. Rico, supra note 6, at 47. For a different distinction between referential discourse (as in
-the application of law) and legislative discourse (as in the creation of law), see A. J. GREIMAS,
SEMIOTIQUE ET SCIENCE SOCIALES 83-85, 103-05 (Editions du Seuil 1976).
29. Rico, supranote 6, at 46-48.
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between the two notions. In French, things are different. Indeed, the
French word "politique"means "policy" in English, but "politique" also
means "politics., 30 The unique French signified emphasizes the
closeness between the two concepts. The difference of linguistic values
between the signifieds of "policy" and "politique" is not due only to
ambiguity. Even when the intention of a French speaker is clear, the
signified is different since it does not express the same contrast that its
English counterpart expresses.
The relations between these four theoretical terms can be presented
by a figure:

A Specific
Language

An
Individual

Signifier

Signifier

Signified

Signified

Referent

This figure represents the indirect and complex relationship
between a language as an objective social phenomenon and its
understanding and use by an individual.3 1 Consider the classic idiom: "A
word can only refer through a concept.
30.
(1990).
31.
A.

Susan R. Ackerman, Triangulatingthe Administrative State, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1417
"Vox significat mediantibus conceptis." See Rico, supra note 6, at 47. C. K. OGDEN & 1.

RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE UPON

THOUGHT AND OF THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM 11-12 (W. Terrence Gorden, ed., 1966). For a
somewhat similar claim, see Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U.L. REv. 487,

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol23/iss1/2
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11.2. Legal Term and its Signified - Rule of Law, Authority, or
Communication
The narrow version 32 of the "rule of law" principle inhibits - to the
degree to which it is effective - authorities' ability to subject taxpayers
to pure notions or concepts. They must use signifiers and signifieds i.e., words - but they do not have to rely on literalism. 33 This claim is
reinforced when lawmakers, including courts, try to express themselves
through clear language. It is again reinforced when law appliers, again
including courts, pay at least some regard to the relevant legal texts,
including statutes and previous verdicts. Later on, we shall try to
appease some rules-skeptic theories and base our argument on
communication rather than the rule of law.
The result proposed here - which will stay crude and tentative for
some paragraphs - is that the more effectively 34 we apply the rule of
law, the more it compels authorities to use legal terms that imply not
notions, but concepts embedded in the language of authoritative written
sources - like legislation, verdicts and regulations. Since the definition
of "a signified" is "a concept embedded in language," and since writing
is a representation of words, the result can be paraphrased: legal terms in
the legal-positivistic sense (some of which are called, by jurists, "legal
concepts") are words implying signifieds. For example, according to our
theory, the legal term "business expenses," as used by United States
federal income tax law, implies a signified. This signified is a notion
embedded in the language of those familiar with that law.35 To legal
terms and their signifieds we can apply the sociolinguistic insights about
jargons and sociolects, which are variations of languages and are derived
from common professional interaction and knowledge, as well as from

491 (1986).
32. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering The Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 781, 783-87 (1989).
33. We reject "literalist," "plain meaning," or "textualist" theories of interpretation. For some
discussion of this issue, see Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the
Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C.L. REV. 623, 629-30 (1986); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 340-45, 354-56
(1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626-28 (1990). For
the dichotomy between literal and non-literal uses of language in relation to some theories of
meaning, see Brenda Danet, Language in the Legal Process, 14 LAW & SOCY REV. 445, 455-57
(1980) [hereinafter Danet, Language and Process]. For an earlier note implying this controversy,
see Williams, supra note 12, at 191-92.
34. It is the same for us if ineffectiveness is due to impossibility, incapacity or to lack of will.
35. For a somewhat resembling claim, see John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and
Fairness:Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 35 (1993).
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social segregation 36 (hereinafter "sociolects"). In addition, according to
legal positivism the meaning of any legal term is derived from the legal
texts, rules, principles and theory that relate to it 37 (see some reservations
later on). 38
We can present all these arguments with a figure:

An individual
familiar with
US Federal
Income Tax

US Federal Income
Tax (as a sociolect of
the English language)
Legal Term:

Signifier

Signifier

Signified

Signified

Referent
In all of this we join efforts aimed at blurring or overcoming the

36. For some more discussion and references, see infra Part VII.2 ("Sociolinguistic Exclusion
and Public Language Inhibition of Avoidance").
37. For meaning of legal-terms as derived from the current and substantive law, see
MELLINKOFF, supra note 14, at 392-93. For the role of the legal system in the definition of legal
terms, see H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,70 THE LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW

37, 49, 58 (1954). For that and for derivation from the social context of the law, see Peter
Goodrich, The Role of Linguistics in Legal Analysis, 47 MODERN LAW REVIEW 523, 524, 530-32
(1984) (discussing Hart, supra). For an extremely narrow view of such positivism, attributed to
Kelsen, see PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 39-40, 60-62, 128 (1987). For an analysis of the effect of judicial precedents on the
meaning (and lack of precision) of legal-terms, see MELLINKOFF, supra note 14, at 374-83. For the
claim that "responsibility for law language is fixed upon the profession," see id., at 454. For claims,
about the impact of intertextuality and legal-principles on the meaning of terms, see MALEY, supra
note 14, at 25-26. See also WORDS AND PHRASES (Thomson Canada Ltd. 1993).
38. For rule-skepticism, see shortly hereinafter. For speakers control of language, which also
opposes the views of legal positivism, see infra Part VI. I ("Control of Tax-Terms: Authorities,
Practitioners or Taxpayers?").
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distinction between "textual" (or literal) and "substantive" rules of legal
interpretation. 39
For us a "substantive" interpretation, i.e. an
interpretation using current values and policy considerations, is part of
the legal sociolect. It is so if a practitioner can reasonably estimate that
under the circumstances of his client,40 a statute will be read in an
irregular way, so as not to interfere with such "substantive"
considerations.
This may also help us understand the possible contribution of
linguistic expertise to the interpretation of legal texts. Linguists can
explain the signifieds of terms (and of legal terms) as non-jurists
understand them. On occasion - and especially when the law41 must or
should be understood by laypersons 42 - expert linguistic testimony can
39. For a statement of the distinction and for such efforts, see GOODRICH, supra note 37, at
43-45, 56-60, 78, 110-11, 114-15, 122, 204. See also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 350-54
(1986); William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1483
(1986-1987); Miller, supra note 35, at 48.
40. For an acknowledgment of "context" as an interpretive tool, for the changing and flexible
meaning of words, and for claims about conflicts that arise between a tax code and regular
language, see Zelenak, supra note 33, at 637-5 1. For some theory about interpretation and context,
see Eskridge & Frickey, supranote 33, at 340-45, 354-56.
41. Please note that linguists can give expert opinions not only on the meaning of law, but
also on the meaning of oral or written evidence. E.g., GEORGIA M. GREEN, LANGUAGE IN THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 247 (Judith N. Levi & Anne Graffam Walker eds., 1990).
42. For the claim that a basis of law (consensus) is contradicted by its language and practice,
which both restrict its access to the legal elite, see GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 7. For examples of
laws demanding use of plain-language, for general arguments about the necessity of such language
and of lay-intelligible legal sources and communication, for comprehension measures and for
bibliography on these subjects, see Robert W. Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game Is Over, 13
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 519, 531-57 (1985) (mentioning, among other circumstances,
taxpayers reactions to the language of tax-forms - referring on page 534 to findings by Siegel &
Gale Inc., IRS TAX FORMS SIMPLIFICATION PROJECT INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT 63 (1980); see

also note 265 and text on page 566). See Benson supra, at 572-573 for a list of legal rules
mandating the use of plain language. For rules and circumstances in which lay-intelligibility is
necessary, related to criminal law, to injunctions and to jury instructions, see Mary Jane Morrison,
Excursions Into the Nature ofLegal Language, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 281-85 (1989). For rewriting a law so laypersons understand it better, and for an empirical examination of the effort, see
Britt-Louise Gunnarsson, Functional Comprehensibility of Legislative Texts: Experiments with a
Swedish Act of Parliament,4 TEXT 71, 78 (1984) (discussing the audience - lay or professional - to
which a statute is aimed). For the plain legal language movement, see Brenda Danet, Language and
the Law: An Overview of Fifteen Years of Research, in HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY 537, 538-41 (Howard Giles & W. Peter Robinson eds., 1990) [herinafter Danet,
Language and Law]. For a critique of legal language and its incomprehensibility to laypersons, and
for possible reform, see Danet, Language and Process, supra note 33, at 464-68, 484-90, 547-48.
For use of ordinary language in law, see Giorgio Lazzaro, Law and Ordinary Language, in LAW
AND LANGUAGE - THE ITALIAN ANALYTICAL SCHOOL 175 (Anna Pintore & Mario Jori eds., 1997).

For a regular-language meaning to the term "accident" according to Canadian insurance law, see
WORDS AND PHRASES, supra note 37, at 1-76. See also SOLAN, supra note 10, at 119, 130-31, 13538. For a brief discussion of the prospects of implementing changes to legal language, from a year-
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be of much use.43 On other occasions 44 it may hinder the use of legal
terms in ways that reflect the divergence of a legal sociolect from the
related general language.45
A side effect of the claim that legal terms imply signifieds is that
this subjects the former (legal terms), by a significant measure, to
linguistic processes influencing the latter (signifieds).
Please note that, somewhat like Caton and Morrison,46 we refuse to
define a distinct "language of the law"; we claim only the existence of

1982 perspective, see Veda R. Charrow etal., Characteristicsand Functionsof Legal Language, in
SUBLANGUAGE: STUDIES OF LANGUAGE IN RESTRICTED SEMANTIC DOMAINS 175, 186-88 (Richard

Kittredge & John Lehrberger eds., 1982). For discussion of such prospects for improvement, from a
1985 perspective, see Brenda Danet, Legal Discourse, I HANDBOOK OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS:
DISCIPLINES OF DISCOURSE 273, 287-88 (1985) [hereinafter Danet, Legal Discourse]. For a claim
about law in general, a claim that opposes a measure in the text above, see Morrison, supra note 42,
at 320. For a claim that legal sources should be construed according to regular language, see Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899). For a
short comment about situations in which laymen have to understand the law, and the negative
effects of unintelligibility, see MELLINKOFF, supra note 14, at 453.

43. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1562
(1994). For a judicial response, see generally Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 600 (1994);
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 39 (1994). For judicial disregard, see generally National
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 249 (1994); Gary S. Lawson, Linguistics and
Legal Epistemology: Why the Law Pays Less Attention to Linguists Than It Should, 73 WASH. U. L.
Q. 995, 995-96 (1995) (stating the law is subject to proof just like fact). We do not agree. For a
judicial rejection of such expert testimony, which seems erroneous, see Proceedingsof the Law and
Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 800, 924 (1995) (citing the statements of Professor
Chuck Fillmore). For a contradictory claim, according to which courts do not need linguistic
expertise in order to understand language because they know the general language, see Morrison,
supra note 42, at 330-31. Interestingly, a page later, and in a slightly different context, the author
raises the possibility that her "ear for ordinary English ...may have been bent by the law's view."
This argument shows that legal experts, including courts, may need the help of linguistic expertise
in order to distinguish regular from legal meaning of a term. Id. at 332.
44. For a claim that "[mi]any parts of the Code are consulted only by specialists" ("the Code"
refers to the U.S Federal Internal Revenue Code), see Zelenak, supra note 33, at 664-65 ("The more
complex a statute, the more likely it is to be addressed to specialists in the statutory subject matter,
rather than to the general public"). Zelenak attributes this idea to Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes. 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 536 (1947). For some discussion
about the various "audiences" of law, see JACKSON, supra note 12, at 284-87.
45. For a very clear illustration of this divergence, related to the interpretation of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, see Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech " - Obscenity and
"Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretationof ConstitutionalLanguage, 67 GEO. L. J. 899, 90507, 909-10 (1987). Interestingly, one can find in a dictionary the following example: "To the lay
mind the language of a lawyer seems to be full of jargon." OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNERS
DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 485 (6th ed. 2000) (defining "lay" (definition number six)).
46. PHILOSOPHY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE vii-xi (Charles E. Caton ed., U. of Ill. Press
1963). For some analysis of PHILOSOPHY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE, supra, related to the said
issue, and for a well-founded claim that the law is part of the English language, see Morrison, supra
note 42, at 276, 286-90, 298-303.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol23/iss1/2

12

Pasternak and Rico: Tax Interpretation, Planning, and Avoidance: Some Linguistic Anal

2008]

TAX INTERPRETATION, PLANNING, AND AVOIDANCE

legal sociolects (or technolects). 47 This is so because the difference
between a legal sociolect and its related general language is not as wide
as the difference between languages. Linguists may not even make note
of their refusal to count "English-Legalese" among the languages of the
world.48 Opinions of linguistics-oriented academics who do note the
question may diverge, 49 and we join the refusing side for the following
reasons. The sociolect related to the U.S. federal income tax is not as
different from general English as French is; lay English speakers may
easily, but ''not accurately, 50 understand "taxpayer" but not
"contribuable. 5'
This does not imply that every legal term or
combination of legal terms is recognized by laymen. 52 It just implies an
extensive resemblance. This claim implies that even lay speakers of
English have a significant understanding of their countries' legal
sociolects, because these are only variations of the general language.
Here we do not try to contradict the "language of the law" literature; we
53
are only noticing different definitions of the term "language.
Until now the main claim of this sub-chapter - that legal terms
imply specific signifieds - has been tentative. Let us now refine and
affirm it.
47. For a claim that legal terms are not technical, but rather more distinctive uses of regular
language, see Morrison, supra note 42, at 290, 300-36.
48. E.g., DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE 286-87 (2d ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
49. For discussion of this conceptual question, for some references to differing opinions, and
for application onto law of the concepts "language," "dialect," "register," and "diglossia," see
Danet, Language and Process, supra note 33, at 470-74. For some brief comments about the
question, restricted to legal English, and for the additional concept of "sublanguage," see Danet,
Legal Discourse, supra note 42, at 275, 277-78. For some discussion of whether a "language of the
law" exists and for a claim that the law is part of the general English language, see Morrison, supra
note 42, at 275. For the definition of a legal-English-language as a "professional sublanguage" and
"a variety of English," see Charrow et al., supra note 42, at 175. For law as a "dual semiotic
system" within natural languages, and for attributing this claim to A. J. Greimas, see JACKSON,
supranote 12, at 12-13.
50. Morrison, supranote 42, at 317.
51. Which is the French word for "taxpayer."
52. For a discussion of some parts of the legal "language" which are unintelligible for the
laymen, see MELLINKOFF, supra note 14, at 419-23, 429-36.
53. Today jurists use mostly sociolects (or technolects). In some eras and places, versions of
foreign languages were and are used for law. For current and past states of the language of law in
some specific geographic areas, see MELLINKOFF, supra note 14, at 419-36; N. Love, Correctness
and Norms, in CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRAGMATICS 179, 183-85 (Jacob L. Mey ed., 1998);
Lawrence M. Friedman, Law and its Language, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 563, 563 (1964); Benson,
supra note 42; YON MALEY, supra note 14, at 11;Kent Greenawalt, The "Language of Law" and
"More Probable Than Not".- Some Brief Thoughts, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 989, 989 (1995); SOLAN,
supra note 10. For a comment about variations of "legal English" used in India, see V. K. Bhatia,
Language of the Law, 20 LANGUAGE TEACHING 227, 232 (1987).
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From the perspective of language evolution and legal authority,
signifieds implied by legal terms and tax terms cannot be characterized
as typical. We shall see later on 54 that the semantic control of tax terms
is shared by taxpayers and authorities. We shall see that authorities have
a bigger role in the shaping of legal signifieds, as compared to their
influence on signifieds in regular language.
This refinement, and the "authoritarian" aspect of legal-terms and
their implied signifieds, help to free our arguments from too heavy a
dependency on the rule of law principle and on legal positivism. It
implies that authoritative applications of legal rules that contradict or are
unrelated to the language of the relevant legal source 55 can be considered
an abrupt (authority-induced) evolution or change of legal-signifieds. It
is especially so when a community of specialists track and learn such
changes.5 6 This evolution does not have to be predictable; it can be
arbitrary or motivated by extra-legal considerations, as is usually (or
sometimes) the case in language evolution.57
Moreover, perhaps we can make our claims more acceptable to
supporters of non-positivistic, rules-critical or rules-skeptic theories.58
54. Infra Part VI. ("Control of Tax-Terms: Authorities, Practitioners or Taxpayers?").
55. For when a tax-law is interpreted in a non-literal way, see Zelenak, supra note 33. For
when a court decides that a law prohibiting the shedding of blood on the streets does not apply to
such medical acts, see Zelenak, supra note 33, at 632, (citing U.S. v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 487
(1868); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31 (1982). For when a
court calls a "bicycle" a "carriage," see MALEY, supra note 14, at 30-31. For when we surprisingly

lose our linguistic expertise, see SOLAN, supra note 10, at 59-63, (under the heading "Why Judges
Do Not Make Good Linguists"). For a distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic (i.e.,
"substantive") rules of interpretation, see SOLAN, supra note 10, at 65-67, 76.
56. The new meaning changes the definition of the interpreted legal term. For an implicitly
supportive idea, see Zelenak, supra note 33, at 664-65, which states:
A court should be somewhat more willing to adopt a contextual interpretation that is
difficult or impossible to reconcile with the literal language of a statute when the statute
is addressed to an audience of specialists, rather than to the public at large. This is true
whether the standard of interpretation is based on intent or meaning . . . Specialists
would be more likely than a general audience to understand the statutory context as a
possible basis for nonliteral or unusual interpretations of the statutory language.
Moreover, once such an interpretation has been judicially or administratively
propounded, specialists are more likely than members of the general public to know of
the interpretation.
Id.
57. PETER WUNDERLI, PRINCIPES DE DIACHRONIE 35, 113 (1990) (quoting R. ENGLER &
FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURS DE LINGUISTIQUE GENERALE, EDITION CRITIQUE (par R.E., tome
1, Wiesbaden 1968)); C. Rico, Synchronie et diachronie:enjeu d'une dichotomie, REVUE BIBLIQUE,

CENT HUITIEME ANNEE, 228, 242-46 (J Gabalda & Cie Editeurs 2001) (Fr.) (discussing the
approach of GUSTAVE GUILLAUME, IN LANGAGE ET SCIENCE DU LANGAGE (1964)); Rico, supra
note 6.
58. E.g., Anthony D'Amato, PragmaticIndeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 150 (1990);
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We can reduce the basis of our claims from the existence of the rule of
law to one of its components, communication. 59 This is a component
60
which may be acceptable to at least one rules-skeptic academic.
Behind the arguments presented in the coming paragraph is the insight
that law and its application - like language and "parole" (i.e. speech or
use of language) respectively - can function to a significant extent in
spite of exceptions, ambiguity, inaccuracies, vagueness, different
definitions by different persons, new applications ('Jamais dit"), and
variations. 61
So, a legal term can be analyzed from the point of view of its
signified - even if we question the validity of the rule of law - if those in
power wish to communicate among themselves or with their subjects.
Generally, the most effective mode of communication is language, and
language entails signifieds.
Thus, our claims can be useful even to someone who questions the
validity of the narrow rule of law principle - so long as he thinks
authorities (legal, social, patriarchal, etc.) use communication. Such
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Radin, supra note 32, at 797-801;
Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Breaking the Rules?: Wittgenstein and Legal Realism, 107 YALE L.J.
1853, 1856 (1998); Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the
Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1068-71 (1993); Mark Hager, Against Liberal
Ideology, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 1051, 1051-063 (1988) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987)). For a positivists' view on rule skepticism, see HART, supra note
9, at 136-41. For a related analysis of the debate between legal positivism and Ronald Dworkin see
Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT 149, 158-64 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
This Hart-Dworkin debate is not really problematic for the thesis of our paper because both claim
that the law can pre-determine (i.e. communicate) its orders significantly, be it through rules or
standards.
For such an analysis of Dworkin, and some critique of predictability (i.e. of
communication) under Dworkin, see Radin, supra note 32, at 804-06.
59. Radin, supra note 32, at 785-86.
For some more discussion of positivism and
communication, see JACKSON, supra note 12, at 126-30, 148-66.
For use of language to
communicate tax rules, see Miller, supra note 35, at 44.
60. See Anthony D'Amato, Can LegislaturesConstrainJudicialInterpretationof Statutes? 75
VA. L. REV. 561, 564-65, 602 (1989) (noting, though, at 597, that he agrees with the claim that
unprovability can be extended to "linguistic demonstrations"). See also D'AMATO, supra note 58, at
151, n.12. For some predictability, which is implicitly necessary for effective communication, see
D'Amato, supra note 58, at 184-86.
61. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 11-12 (comparing wrongly-formed but nevertheless
performing language uses and legal applications of rules); Cunningham, supra note 43, at 1567-568,
1610; Love, supranote 53 (especially at the beginning); Ruth Kempson, Pragmatics:Languageand
Communication, in THE HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTICS 394-95 (Mark Aronoff & Janie Rees-Miller
eds., 2001); MAURICE PERGNIER, LES FONDEMENTS SOCIOLINGUISTIQUE DE LA TRADUCTION 362,
473 (Diffusion Librairie Honore Champion 2d ed. 1980); ANDRt MARTINET, LEMENTS DE
LINGUISTIQUE GtNtRALE 148-50, 179-81 (1970). For a jurist's perspective on linguistic precision,
made through a comparison between general language and legal language, see MELLINKOFF, supra
note 14, at. 393-98.
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communication does not have to take place only between legislators and
subjects. It can be between legislators and courts, between parties to a
contract, between courts and administration, between government and
parliament, etc. This communication is not restricted to legal rules. It
can express interests, values, standards or political power and can make
use of any term. This communication is not restricted to public
authorities, and it can relate to authorities created via private law
institutions like property, contracts, and corporation charters. The sum
total of our claim is that as long as authorities communicate, legal terms,
or whatever terms they use, imply signifieds.
An additional problem we may face is related to the dishonest
application of legal terms. We do not mean the dishonest application of
tax terms by taxpayers. This is covered by criminal law, which is not the
subject of this paper. We are referring to dishonest rhetoric by
authorities, like courts. "The notion that judges articulate one set of
reasons for their decisions while actually deciding cases on other
grounds is not a new one.' 62 Dishonesty is a problem that is not
restricted to courts or law; it is a problem for anyone who tries to
communicate. If one63 can read between the lines, one may be able to
perceive the real, hidden reasons for a decision. When one cannot - and
this can happen to the cleverest of lawyers - one is deceived.
H.3. Terminology of This Paper
For the sake of precision we will use the linguistic definition of the
terms "signifier," "signified" and "referent." The expression "legal
term," and more particularly "tax term," will be used to describe "legal
concepts" (in the juridical sense) that imply specific signifieds in legal
sociolects - signifieds that are determined or influenced by legal theory
and knowledge. The term "notion" will denote a concept as a thought.
For example, consider the following statement: "The notion of
'income' is different from the signified of the legal term 'income.'
Based on our terminology, this statement claims that our conception of
income (be it economic or legal) cannot be the same as the legal
signified we call "income."

62. SOLAN, supra note 10, at 176. See also CALABRESI, supra note 55, at 172-81 and David
L. Shapiro, In Defense of JudicialCandor, 100 HAR. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987).
63. If everybody can read between the lines, we change our language and regain our lost
honesty.
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III. TAx BASE

The four-faceted distinction mentioned in the previous part of this
paper explains some of the difficulties authorities face while trying to
identify the tax base. 64 Since authorities bear costs while imposing
taxes, 65 they try to avoid these costs by skipping - most of the time - the
difficult passage from abstract legal terms to referents related to a
specific taxpayer. Usually they do not observe economic activity as it is;
they work with written communication about this activity (i.e., tax
reports, tax records, documentation, receipts and bank records).6 6 And
so, although taxes are supposed to be levied based on economic activity,
they are levied in fact mostly on the basis of written communication (this
may exclude, to some degree, customs). 67 The use of communication
about reality as a substitute for observation increases the importance of
linguistic analysis.
In addition, the communication that authorities usually receive is
partial, indirect, and retrospective. These authorities usually wait till the
end of a tax period (a year, a month, etc.), and then ask only for written
reports drafted especially to communicate with them. Only sometimes
do they ask for reports of communications between the taxpayer and
third parties such as business partners, employees, debtors or banks.
For example, a taxpayer may submit his annual tax return to a tax
68
authority, declaring taxable bottom lines and his estimated tax liability.
This is a form of indirect and retrospective communication about his
economic activity. If the authority chooses, it may audit him. 69 This
audit may be via a short physical visit, a meeting or a mail exchange. A
physical audit occurs when an authority sends someone to check if
indeed the taxpayer is doing things suggested by the communication, if
indeed he runs the business declared in his return. These physical audits

64. See supraPart 1.1 ("General Introduction").
65. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Cost of Taxation and the MarginalEfficiency Cost
of Funds, 43 Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Papers 172, 179-80 (1996).
66. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 6, 113 (Edward J. Smith ed., West
2000). See also CORPORATE, PARTNERSHIP, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAXATION 3-5 (James W. Pratt &

William N. Kulsrud eds., McGraw Hill 1997) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAXATION]. For some rules
of information reporting, see THURONYI, supra note 1, at 210-1I. For comparative-international
perspective, see HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION : A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 14 (2004).

67. Customs are subject to unusually intensive physical scrutiny, so this part of the paper may
be less applicable to them.
68. See Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived Fairness and
MitigatingSystemic Costs, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1515, 1543-544 (2005).
69. Id.
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only show if one or two visits can disprove the hypothesis that the
taxpayer is economically active in the ways he claims to be. They do
not reveal his year-long activities or his gains, and if an authority was to
try to levy taxes solely on the basis of these audits, without taking any
documents into account, revenues would be very small.
So, these physical audits are only a secondary means. The first is a
review of the taxpayer's records and documentation, including receipts
and bank records. This is a review of communication between the
taxpayer and the authority, and between the taxpayer and third parties.
An audit may omit physical encounters entirely, and be conducted by
mail or at the authority's offices. In the end, authorities tax mostly
based on observed communication rather than observed physical activity
(here was our modification to the definition of the "tax base"). It is
hoped that this communication provides a sufficient representation of
(the bottom lines of) economic activity. If we want to find out the
degree to which this is true, we have to study the gap between this
communication and reality.
To the extent that tax collection is based on communication, it
encounters one of the basic linguistics truths: language always changes
(it is "un devenir permanent").7 ° When we add this to the argument that
communication is the basis for taxation, we contradict - to the extent
that this argument is true - an implied assumption of economic theory.
This assumption is that taxes are levied on economic activity according
to rules set by lawmakers. Indeed, to an important measure this
assumption is true, but taxes are also subject to an ever changing
language machine. This machine and the implications it holds for taxes
are the subjects of our research.
IV. VAGUENESS OF APPLIED TAX LAW

IV.]. Semantic Extension, Indeterminacy- Cores, Penumbrasand
Vagueness
Hart's legal positivism says, under the title "open texture of law,'
that every legal term has a clear core and a vague penumbra. When we
forbid "vehicles" from entering the park, it is clear this includes cars

supra note 57, at 139-40.
supra note 9, at 124-36.

70.

WUNDERLI,

71.

HART,
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(part of the core of the term "vehicle"), and unclear whether this
includes bicycles and toy scooters (part of the penumbra).,
Some aspects of semantics, which may be considered the study of
meaning, 73 relate strongly to non-linguistic phenomena: it is "open" to
the world. 74 This quality is most apparent when non-linguists - like tax
jurists - use definitions of legal tax terms and apply or interpret tax law.
Since anyone involved in the field of taxation has to deal extensively
with definitions and their application and interpretation, semantic theory
may prove useful.7 5
One should note some similar terms the two disciplines use.
According to Ducrot and Schaeffer,7 6 the term "semantic extension"
describes expressions with abstract meanings that may refer to many
They explain that the term
different things (like "vehicle").
"indeterminacy" (according to them, it is called "vagueness" by English
philosophers), relates to expressions whose range of application is
unresolved.
We can now start to expand (or contradict) Hart's argument.7 7

72. Id. at 126-29; BRIAN BIX, LAW LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 10-11 (1993)
(crediting these ideas, on page 10, to Friedrich Waismann, "'Verifiability," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 19 SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 119-50 (1945)); Williams, supra note 12, at
181-95 (noting that sometimes law converts continuous reality into binary results, and that
sometimes continuous results are preferable). See also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661-69 (1958). For a critique of the
existence of "cores", related to semantics, see GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 58-60. For some
discussion of Hart's theory, and for related references to Greimas, Jackobson and others, see
JACKSON, supra note 12, at 43-46 and 148-66. For further comments on Goodrich in relation to
legal positivism and realism and to ideology, see also JACKSON, supra note 12, at 10-11. For a
more general treatment of vagueness, and for critique of Hart and Fuller, see Moore, supra note 5, at
193-200, 273-77 and 286-94. See also LEECH, supra note 5, at 84-85; Christian Zapf & Eben
Moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law: On the Perils of Misunderstanding
Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. L. J. 485, 489 (1996). For another example of "bicycle" and "carriage," see
MALEY, supra note 14, at 30-31; WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 189 (giving examples of the bicycle
and carriage example in Burrows's WORDS AND PHRASES). For some more discussion of Hart's
theory, and some references to philosophers and others who treat this subject, see SOLAN, supra
note 10, at 96-98; Radin, supra note 32, at 794. For a linguist's perspective, including empirical
method, see Cunningham, supra note 43, at p. 1585-1625. See also KURT BALDINGER, SEMANTIC
THEORY: TOWARDS A MODERN SEMANTICS 42-43 (Roger Wright ed., 1980) (claiming that for the
law, the limits of a term are more important than its core). For some critique, see D'Amato, supra
note 58, at p. 171-79, 595-602. See also Miller, supra note 35, at 34-37.
73. TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 7.
74. Id. at 12, 20, 22.
75. This may be so despite the tendency of some linguists to restrict their theory to "daily
languages," (e.g., TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 36), and to avoid linguistic analysis of scientific
theories.
76. DUCROT & SCHAEFFER, supra note 8, at 339.
77. HART, supranote 9.
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First, using the notion of synonymy, we find that the cores of different
tax terms can partially overlap.78 For example, "wages" and "business
losses" can both be core descriptions of the same item, like when an
owner of a losing corporation is also an employee, and he pays himself
real, justified market-value wages that directly cause these losses.
Second, B. L. Whorf claims that ideas (and to our understanding, also
signifieds) are interconnected and that their penumbras partially
overlap. 79 For example, housing an employee may be a benefit to him or
a demand made by his employer - but it may also be a mixture of the
two. Moreover, it may be one of many possible mixtures of the two,
varying according to the degree of each component. When it is clearly
the former, it is a taxed benefit (or payment in kind); when it is clearly
the latter, it is an untaxed "duty toward work., 80 Cases in between, for
which it both benefits the employee to some degree and is weakly
demanded of him, may lie in the penumbras of both legal terms
(depending on the particulars of the relevant law). Such overlaps can
also occur between a core and a penumbra, or between multiple cores
and penumbras.
IV.2. Semantics - Accuracy in Taxation is Affected by Semantic
Extensions, Synonymy, and Vagueness ofApplication
We can now start the process of tying together the claim of the
previous chapter (about the tax-base) 8 1 and of the previous sub-chapter
(about semantic extension and indeterminacy).82 The linguistic theory
this paper applies claims that legal terms imply signifieds of the legal
sociolect. A signified is defined negatively by its differences from other
signifieds (Saussure calls it "valeur," i.e., linguistic "value"). That is,
every word (or other linguistic unit) 83 is defined by its differences from
and relations to other words in the linguistic system to which it
belongs. 84 For our purposes it implies that tax law has to use distinct 78. For somewhat similar results, related to polysemy, see GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 5860.
79. BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY 35-39 (John B. Carroll ed.,
1964).
80. E.g., I.R.C. §119.
81. Supra Part III ("Tax Base").
82. Supra Part IV.I ("Semantic Extension, Indeterminacy - Cores, Penumbras, and
Vagueness").
83. SAUSSURE, supra note 15, at 146-49.
84. Id. at 159-62,166-69; TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 21-22; Depecker, supra note 6, at
55-63; GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 25, 73-74 (noting a distinction between semantic extension and
intension). For description and critique, including a cited critique by Ricceur (LA METAPHORE VIVE
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but related - legal terms in order to communicate its orders. It implies
that overlapping penumbras are an unavoidable part of the way meaning
appears in language - this is how meaning is created - and therefore tax
legislators and interpreters cannot avoid it.
Distinctions come from the application of different tax rules and
results to the different legal terms 85 related to various referents. On the
one hand, to the measure that authorities want to tax all economic
income or wealth, tax terms must semantically cover all activities,
situations and events that create or constitute them. 86 "Covering" means
"not letting any activity, event or state of affairs avoid description" and
is achieved by legal terms whose penumbras touch each other. Since
penumbras are vague, "touch" in fact means "overlap. 87 In other
words, partial synonymy of tax terms is an inescapable side effect of
covering reality that provides avoidance opportunities and creates
interpretation difficulties. This paper argues that taxpayers overuse
vagueness and even enhance it by modifying language, making these
difficulties and avoidance opportunities significant.
One can illuminate this theory with an example. Let us consider
how the following terms have both distinct and shared semantic content:
"work," "wage," "dividend," "donation," "gift," "sale," and "interest."
"Work" and "wage" may overlap, for example, when an employer pays
for employee expenses like a cab ride for business and pleasure
purposes.88 "Wage" and "dividend" may overlap, for example, when a
company pays its owner a salary vaguely related in size to undistributed
profits. 89 "Dividend" may overlap "donation" when a corporation owner
wishes to donate money but does so through the company he controls. 90
"Donation" may overlap with "gift" when someone donates to an
(1975)), see Rico, supra note 6, at 387, 390, 401-05.
85. For example, under federal income tax, partnerships are taxed differently than other
corporations.
86. For semantic covering of a legally regulated activity, see MALEY, supra note 14, at 22;
JACKSON, supra note 12, at 39-41. For ambiguities in language defining income, see HENRY C.
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL
POLICY 50-51 (1938). See also BORIS I. BITTKER, ET AL, A COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE?
A DEBATE (1968).

87. The above text is a bit optimistic. Legal terms may have core-to-penumbra overlap or
even core-to-core overlap when an activity is clearly covered by the cores of two different terms.
E.g., a personal "gift" may be an essential "business expense."
88. This example is related to I.R.C. § 162 (business expenses) and § 61 (defining "gross
income").
89. For a somewhat similar issue, under the heading "constructive distributions," see
CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 66, at 18-20.

90.

For a mix of this example and the next one, see CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 66, at
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organization whose activities benefit his relative. 9' "Gift" may overlap
with "sale" when a firm supplies goods or services for prices that are
lower than market value. 92 "Sale" may overlap with "interest" when a
firm gives its creditor preferential treatment in business deals not
connected to the loan. These examples ordered the seven legal terms in
a file, with each one partially overlapping the next, but things are not as
restricted: we can demonstrate connections between any pair of them.
This semantic phenomenon relates to the complexity and
indeterminacy discussions about tax law. 93 This paper claims that
adding more terms to a legal system has the side effect of increasing
vagueness, partial synonymy of terms (and ambiguity) and interpretation
difficulties. For many fields of law, adding more specific terms to
promote rational arrangements and justice is more effective than it is in
tax law. 94 In other fields of law, the side effects of vagueness and partial
legal synonymy do not undermine the main objective. As we argue in
this paper, taxpayers' negative reactions increase vagueness and
synonymy, undermining the main objective of tax laws. We shall see
later on 95 that taxpayers tend to "misuse" penumbras and even enlarge
them. If these additional claims are indeed correct, we can arrive at
results reminding us of D'Amato's and encounter the following tax-law
paradox: the more accurate tax terms there are, the more indeterminacy
and vagueness are created. 96 If for general law, simple and general
terms cause indeterminacy and vagueness, and finely tuned terms bring
predictability, it is not so for tax law. In tax law, both simplicity and
intricacy bring indeterminacy, so moderation is the key.
IV.3. Tax Avoidance - Legitimacy and HindsightAdvantage
The first result of legal-term overlap and partial synonymy is that
91. Id.
92. E.g., non "arm's length" deals. OROW, supra note 1, at 282-84.
93. One can find much literature on this subject. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 35; McCaffery,
supra note 20; Sidney Roberts et al., A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAx L. REV.
325, 331-34 (1972); Laurence N. Woodworth, Tax Simplification and the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 711, 711 (1969).
94. See David J. Gerber, U.S. Anti-Trust Law and the Convergence of Competition Laws, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 263,277 (2002).

95. In Parts IV.3 ("Tax Avoidance - Legitimacy and Hindsight Advantage"), V.2 ("Rational
Taxpayers May Prefer Indeterminacy and Vague Application"), VI ("Accelerated Evolution of Tax
Terms"), and VII.2 ("Sociolinguistic Exclusion and Public Language Inhibition of Avoidance").
96. For more thoughts on the subject of highly specific tax-law, see Miller, supra note 35, at
40, 50-52, 69-70, 74-76 (pointing to resulting complexities, comprehension difficulties and use of
discretion. Miller also equates determinacy with arbitrariness). For different claims against the
"too-exact" legal language, see SOLAN, supra note 10, at 118.
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when an activity is covered by two (or more) terms at once, taxpayers
have both motivation and legitimacy to use the term that reduces their
tax burden (see another treatment of legitimacy, later on).97 This result
is implied by the legitimacy of tax planning. 98 Taxpayers are not obliged
to conduct their business in the most expensive way tax-wise. 99

For

example, when tax law levies different tax rates on corporations as
opposed to individuals, and some persons can achieve their economic
goals under the core or penumbra of both terms, they are allowed to use
the term that minimizes their tax burden. This point is reinforced by
another significant advantage taxpayers have. As others have already
noted, 00 in terms of setting laws and regulations, taxpayers have
hindsight while authorities have to prophesize. Taxpayers know the text
of the law, and can choose or manipulate terms in response.
A note for economists: this result seems to contradict the claim that,
under some conditions, the party that moves first has the advantage.' 0 '
The difference may be caused by the dysfunctional aspects of tax rules
and tax terms discussed in this paper. The ability to manipulate legal
terms is the ability to change the rules of the game. The economic claim
does not deal with such a capacity.
The linguistic analysis of the previous subchapters10 2 shows that
legal term overlap is common and prescribes some ways - for both
taxpayers and authorities - to look for such overlaps. Starting with a
specific tax term that describes his activity, a taxpayer can study other
terms with less expensive tax results. If he finds that another term
applies to his activity, a simple renaming may reduce his tax burden.
But in this easy case the taxpayer should mind the possible application
of the first term (i.e., of its signified) as well. Authorities may perform
the same procedure in reverse and not agree to the new name. A
taxpayer may improve his position by altering his activity a bit, drawing
it away from the core of the term (i.e., of the signified) with more
expensive results and toward the core of the other term. 10 3 This
97. In Part VII.I ("Civil Ban on Linguistic Tax Avoidance - Some Difficulties").
98. E.g., OROW, supra note 1, at 250-53; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)
("The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.").
99. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469.
100. See Miller, supra note 35, at 70-71 (referring to Lawrence Lokken, New Rules Bifurcating
ContingentDebt: A Good Start, 51 TAX NOTES 495, 504 (1991).
101. Stackelberg's market leadership model.
102. Supra Parts IV.1 and IV.2.

103. For the idea that individuals can "modify their activity so that it falls in the cracks
between existing rules or comes more ambiguously within any given rule ... ," see Anthony
D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5, 18-19, 32-33 (1983).
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algorithm of tax avoidance confuses the early distinction between
economic and legal tax avoidances,10 4 and is based on the fact that
taxpayers are not obliged105to respect the different theoretical reductions
considered by this paper.

Later on 10 6 we shall see that taxpayers' persistent interests can even
modify the semantic content of words and legal terms (contrary to
jurists' beliefs), thus increasing their avoidance even more actively.
The resulting phenomenon is omnipresent. Let us start with two
examples. Positive law has special rules that deal with the renaming of
"expensive hobbies" as "losing businesses"' 10 7 (hobby farmers and the
like). Those rules are necessary since a taxpayer who succeeds with
such a renaming will pay for the activity out of his gross income rather
than his net income. This approach of positive law sees a hobby as a
discreet activity that can usually be recognized and separated from
business activities. A more sophisticated approach of positive law is the
legal treatment of "business travel and entertainment expenses."' 0 8 A
taxpayer who wants to meet an out-of-town friend can take a day off and
bear his traveling expenses, or he can visit his friend while traveling on
business and let authorities help finance the visit through reduced
this term, and tax law has many rules
taxation. Taxpayers tend to abuse
09
abuse.'
such
preventing
at
aimed
Abstracting from the last two examples, and according to
semantics, we may see that pleasurable activities - of many kinds - can
be covered under light-tax terms like "work" and "expenses." Social
activities, pastimes, idleness and personal spending do not only come in
identifiable units, and not only on the periphery of business - they can
also tint any activity and any tax term. In the widest possible sense, any
reduction of taxes due to a pleasurable activity may be - to a measure tax avoidance achieved via semantic extension (for the difference
between economic tax avoidance and tax avoidance by use of legal
terms, see the introduction).
This result, which affects the evolution of words' meaning, is
reinforced by the theory of tax incidence (mentioned further on)." 0 The
104.
105.

See supra Introduction.
See supra Part 1.2 ("A Comment for Economists").

106. See infra Part VI ("Accelerated Evolution of Tax Terms").
107.
108.
(2002).

AULT & ARNOLD., supranote 66, at 218-21; LAPIDOTH, supra note 1, at 133.
Lawrence Zelenak, The Income Tax and Costs of Earninga Living, 56 TAX L. REv. 39, 63

109. E.g., MERTENS, supranote 66, Vol. 6, § 25D.02.
110. See infra Part V.2 ("Rational Taxpayers May
Application").
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combination ensures that rational parties to any transaction (for example,
employer and employee) will gain from any tax avoidance achieved by
language use.
This example implies that tax avoidance, by means of language, is a
regressive phenomenon - the higher the income, the wider the
possibilities to deduct expenses (this is not a general conclusion; it
relates only to the last result). This result supports the case for
progressive taxation.
IV.4. PenumbrasAre a Problemfor Abstract Law, Theory, and
Interpretation
The results, up to now, touch a more general issue. Abstract law
and theory have a problem dealing with the indeterminacy of language
and the vagueness of its application. We theorize mostly by using core
meanings and simple examples. For us, and after Simons, "income" is
first and foremost an increase in wealth"' (often related to transactions)
- it is not the real-world cloud of vaguely delimited events that can be
described through many synonymous or ambiguous signifieds. It is like
the difference between litigating a complicated case in a trial court and
reading its verdict in an appellate court. Most facts, arguments, causes
of action, choices, and manipulations available to the parties, their
lawyers, the jury, and the judge cannot be learned just by reading the
verdict.' 12

The accuracy-synonymy paradox that undermines the application of
positivistic philosophy" 3 points to another academic problem. Unlike
many other fields, for tax law the more intricate and sophisticated an
interpretive theory is, the more likely it is to become inaccurate. The
more it explains existing and used legal terms, the more likely it is to
become - over time - wrong.

This difficulty implies that, if not careful, we will start thinking that
11I. SIMONS, supra note 86, at 50-51.
112. Usually, a client arrives with a story of many details, and the lawyer can locate many
pieces of facts that correlate imperfectly to various causes of action. The lawyer chooses the facts
he finds "relevant" and omits many others, creating his client's "legal causes" and omitting some
other - less plausible causes. The other party's lawyer does the same and between them, many facts
and possible arguments do not even reach court. Next, the trial court or jury "decides" the facts,
omitting many more and consequently invalidating some legal causes. The appellate court does
more of the same, and the end result is a short verdict - short compared to the volume of evidence,
protocol, and argument materials laid before the courts. For some comments about law school
teaching of facts, see D'Amato, supra note 58, at 187 n.136.
113. Supra Part IV.2 ("Semantics - Accuracy in Taxation is Affected by Semantic Extensions,
Synonymy and Vagueness of Application").
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"vague use of language is an abuse of law." We will claim that
everything is clear or could be clear, like our abstract understanding of
law. We will accuse tax lawyers and taxpayers of opportunism and
socially irresponsible activities; legislators of negligence in drafting
laws; tax authorities of lacking talent and resources; and courts and
4 Indeed, all these accusations may be true
academics of incompetence. 11
to an extent due to reasons unrelated to language. But the linguistic
analysis shows that a measure of these accusations is wrong.
Mellinkoff 15 argued that legal language, excluding its "terms of art" and
their likes, is inaccurate. We move one step further, include "terms of
art," and claim that these accusations are wrong to the extent that
penumbras are unavoidable linguistic features of words in general, and
unavoidable and highly significant features of tax terms in particular.
Legislators, courts, authorities and interpreters cannot avoid them, and
taxpayers cannot avoid acting by them.
Later on we shall see that tax avoidance, by means of language,
relates to social exclusion. 116 This is connected to the motivation of both
taxpayers and practitioners to maintain a low profile in reaction to antiavoidance measures. 1 7 This motivation is based on the fact that
publicity helps authorities tackle avoidance (even when it is not criminal
- this paper deals only with civil law). For the academy, this implies
that studying tax avoidance and interpretation is better when carried out
alongside practice. Unlike other fields, up-to-date tax avoidance and
interpretation are difficult to learn from "concentrated" and "refined"
secondary sources. 8

114. For such accusations, see Roberts et al., supra note 93, p. 331-32, 334-48, 352, 359, 361,
367-68, 371, 374. See also Miller, supra note 35, at 20, 26-27. For such and more claims, related
to general-law (and not only tax-law), see Benson, supra note 42, at 569-71 (discussing the
shortcomings of legal language, and count - as sources to the persistent nature of "legalese,"
"inertia, incompetence, status, power, cost, and risk'); see also Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Reform:
The 1980's In Perspective, 46 TAx L. REV. 489, 536 (1991) (identifying "the real source of the
complexity of the Code: the statutes, regulations and administrative policies aimed at curbing tax
avoidance.").
115. MELLINKOFF, supra note 14, at 387-93.
116. See Part VII.2 ("Sociolinguistic Exclusion and Public Language Inhibition of
Avoidance").
117. See Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV.
255, 261-62 (2002).
118. For the claim that evidence for "tax avoidance ... is not readily available in law books,
because the better the tax-avoidance lawyer, the less likely the scheme will be contested by the
government," see D'Amato, supra note 60, at 584.
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IV.5. Pragmaticsand UnclearApplication of Legal Terms
Added to the previously discussed complexities of tax-law
application is the fact that context is a key element in communication.
An out-of-context word or sentence (which can represent a term of tax
law, like "expenses") is therefore prone to ambiguity. Usually, when we
want others to understand us, we have to be aware of context, and we
have to use - on top of words and sentences - references to past acts of
communication and events, gestures and even physical motions like
pointing. The reason for this is both positive and negative. On the
positive side, the reason is that most abstract words and sentences,
including tax terms, have a vague delimitation.' 19 On the negative side,
the reason is that they lack many meaning-creating mechanisms and thus
hold little content. Meaning comes from a combination of factors: the
lexical content of words, grammar, referenced reality, logic, pragmatic
context, and intonation.' 20 All these imply that unlike regular daily
communication, tax terms (like "expenses") have indeterminate and
vague semantic content. This result occurs despite legislative efforts
aimed at clarity. 121 For example, good partners to any economic activity
can communicate like friends. They can use single words and short
sentences to communicate ideas and facts that a listener would find hard
to understand or recognize. Legislators and authorities are not on such
close terms with taxpayers. Legislators and tax authorities do not have
the will or the resources to learn the daily details of taxpayers'
businesses and jobs. Taxpayers do not invite authorities to learn the
details of their projects and actions - they report only what they must or
what helps reduce their tax burden. They do not reveal their thoughts to
authorities. Lack of familiarity hinders communication, and reduces the
communicative efficacy of any text (either to or from authorities) and
reduces our ability to achieve correct interpretation or application.

119.
120.

TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 50.
Moore, supra note 5, at 183-187; TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 50, 110; SAUSSURE,

supra note 15, at 150-51; WHORF, supra note 79, at 258-60.

For an economic approach to

pragmatics, see ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, Strategic Considerations in Pragmatics, in ECONOMICS AND
LANGUAGE 37 (2000). For a more modest version of pragmatics, see LEECH, supra note 5, at 67-68

and 319-41. Legislative texts have additional problems, not usually present in regular language, see
supra note 42 about the plain language movement, and see also V. K. Bhatia, Syntactic
Discontinuity in Legislative Writing and its Implicationsfor Academic Legal Purposes, in READING
FOR PROFESSIONAL PURPOSES: STUDIES AND PRACTICE IN NATIVE AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES 90

(K. Pugh & J. M. Ulijn eds., 1984).
121. For the contradicting opinion, that modem legislation is very clear because it employs an
exact and specialized vocabulary, which is drafted carefully and explicitly, see MALEY, supra note
14, at 22-23. For more references to this issue, see Bhatia, supra note 53, at 230-31.
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Taken out of context, most words are ambiguous. They are made
of some alternative cores that interchange according to the situation
where they are used. They also consist of penumbras of a similar
nature.122 Take as an example the different references and tax results
possible within the term "expenses." 123 Signifiers and signifieds are
relatively rigid and fixed parts of language, while reference is designated
in many alternative ways according to context. 124 These results, parts of
which are already noted by L. Fuller, 125 contradict the stable-core claim
of legal positivism: 126 rather, tax terms are not clear in themselves and
cores are unstable.
Another claim by Hart seems to contradict this - or to be
contradicted by linguistic pragmatism. In this claim, Hart says a rule is
clearer than a concrete action demonstrating it.1 27 He says that when a
parent tells his child "when in church, behave so" and demonstrates, the
child may not be sure which parts of the demonstrations are part of the
rule (is taking off my hat with the right hand part of the rule?). This
claim does not contradict the pragmatic-linguistic approach, according to
which an abstract rule is less clear than a concrete use of language. Hart
treats a particular event as a means aimed at defining an abstract rule.'2 8
Pragmatists, however, study the communicative efficacy of a particular
use of language in a particular context.1 29 A third comparison was made
by Solan, 130 who contrasted the capacity to understand language with the
capacity to preset definitive rules.

122. See supra Part IV.1 ("Semantic Extension, Indeterminacy - Cores, Penumbras and
Vagueness").
123. For how many different tax and economic meanings can we use the word "expenses"? Let
us try: "Wage expenses"/"in-shop meals expenses"/"training expenses"/"office expenses"/"capital
business expenses"/"expenses on non arm's-length transactions"/"carry over expenses"/"tax
expenses"/"public expenses"/"medical expenses"/"altemative economic expenses"/"insignificant
expenses"/"criminally reported private expenses."
For a related argument, defining words
according to context, see Glanville Williams, Language and The Law: III, 61 LAW QUARTERLY
REV. 293, 301-302 (1946) ("Words change in meaning according to the word to which they are
being opposed ....).
124. See TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 32-33, 50-51.
125. Fuller, supra note 72, at 664-665 (stating that the phrase, "All improvements must be
promptly reported to," taken out of context can have many different "core" meanings. For some
discussion and references, see Bix, supra note 72, at 30-31.
126. See supra Part IV.] ("Semantic Extension, Indeterminacy - Cores, Penumbras and
Vagueness").
127. HART, supra note 9, at 125-26.
128.

Id.

129.

See Kempson, supra note 61, at 394-95.
SOLAN, supra note 10, at 15-16, 20-23.

130.
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IV. 6. Semantics and Analytical Indeterminacy (Choice ofAnalysis)
Whorf argued that the lexemes (i.e. lexical morphems) of each
language reflect a specific analysis of reality.' 31 Moreover, each
language may create an analysis different from that of another
language.132 He demonstrated this by showing the differences between
words like "time" and "space" in English and Hopi. 33 Simpler
examples may be found for different definitions of colors or in finer
distinctions in one language versus another 134 (see the "policy""politique" comparison discussed earlier).
Applying this idea to
interdisciplinary research, 135 we find, for example, that a legal
36
distinction between capital gains and interest that a legislator created
may not exist for economists. 137 That is to say, the legislator and
microeconomic theory describe reality differently. This example implies
that taxpayers can avoid taxes by choosing between two identical
economic activities that have different tax results. 38 It contributes to the
explanation of the gap discussed in the introduction of this paper. 39 It
also shows that whenever an authority analyzes reality incorrectly, tax
avoidance is possible: combined with authorities' informational
disadvantages - disadvantages that may lead to wrong analyses - the

problem may seem significant.
Most acts of communication, including those between taxpayers
and authorities, use reductions. For example, a year's worth of business
activities is summarized for tax authorities on relatively short (relative to
the activity described) forms, comprised mostly of numbers. Tax
authorities have inferior access to the particulars and facts of the
business, and may find disproving these numbers very difficult. More
generally, if an action (or transaction) has facets that can be semantically
related to more than one tax term, and if the taxpayer chooses a
reduction that substantiates the term taxed less, authorities will find it

131. WHORF, supra note 79, at 57.
132. Id. at 57-64, 158, 213-15, 234-37, 243; J.P. VINAY AND J.DARBELNET,

STYLISTIQUE

COMPAREE DU FRANCAIS ET DE L'ANGLAIS 261-65 (lditions Beauchemin lt~e 1977) (1964).

For a

radical description of the said claim, and for some references, see LEECH, supra note 5, at 26-27.
133. WHORF, supra note 79, at 158-59.
134. VINAY & DARBELNET, supra note 132, at 261-65; LEECH, supra note 5,at 24-26.
135. For the abstract idea of applying these ideas onto variations of "technical sub-languages,"
see WHORF, supra note 79, at 247.
136. E.g., compare I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) with § 1222.
137.

Joseph E. Stiglitz, The General Theory of Tax Avoidance, 38 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL

325, 328 (1985).
138.

FELDMAN & KAY, supranote 18.

139. Supra Part I ("Introduction").
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difficult even to be aware of the alternative tax result. 40 Since, as
mentioned before, 41 taxpayers know the rules of law in advance, they
can plan their actions to achieve both their economic goals and the
desired tax reductions.
V. WHO WANTS VAGUE APPLICATION OF LANGUAGE?

V.I. A PublicPerspective Callsfor Clarity

Indeterminacy and vagueness of application are issues for general
law. 142 They were discussed in the previous chapter of this paper in
relation to tax law, and in our opinion, they should be a major issue for
it. 143 From the public perspective, they are a negative phenomenon in
tax law. 144
They hinder its proper function, they are sources of
avoidance and they cause interpretation difficulties, disputes, and
litigation.
V2. Rational Taxpayers May PreferIndeterminacyand Vague
Application
For private individuals and under economic-egoistic rationality,
indeterminate tax law and vague application can be a positive thing. 145
It
terms
legal/tax
clear
prefer
should
taxpayers
honest
may seem that

140. For a more concrete argument to this end, see Zelenak, supra note 33, at 646 ("The
taxpayer in this situation will tend to give itself the benefit of the doubt, reporting a loss as ordinary
and a gain as capital. If the taxpayer reports a gain as capital, it will be difficult for the Service to
discover whether the Corn Products doctrine should apply because gain realized on the sale of
corporate stock is ordinarily treated as capital gain.").
141. See supra Part IV.3 ("Tax Avoidance -Legitimacy and Hindsight Advantage").
142. E.g., Moore, supra note 5, at 193-200; HART, supra note 9, at 124-36. For the
contradicting claim that vagueness is useful, and for the claim that it is inescapable, see George C.
Christie, Vagueness & Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REV. 885, 885 (1964). For more support for
vagueness, ambiguity and indeterminacy, see Charrow et al., supra note 42, at 182-83 and
JACKSON, supra note 12, at 276-82, 292.
143. For an implied treatment of these issues, in tax law, see Weisbach, supra note I. For
contra-linguistic interpretation of tax law, see John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Pleafor a Decent
Respect for the Tax Code, 71 TuL. L. REV. 1501, 1506-514 (1997). Reading a text with disregard to
its linguistic meaning can be considered as increasing its indeterminacy for any subsequent reading
(and reader). For vagueness as a disqualifying quality of tax regulations, see Lynn Lu, Flunking the
Methodology Test: A Flawed Tax-Exemption Standard for Educational Organizations that
"Advocate a ParticularPosition or Viewpoint," 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 377, 423
(2004).
144. Miller, supra note 35.
145. It is also implied by their possible interest in the rule of law. See supra Part 11.2 ("Legal
Term and its Signified - Rule of Law, Authority, or Communication").
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that entail clear rules. 146 We would like to just pay our taxes and
concentrate our efforts on real and productive activities. But, because of
rationality, asymmetric information, and the ease of tax avoidance
access even for non-sophisticated taxpayers (due to tax incidence, which
will be discussed shortly), vague application of the law may create
private benefits. It may be convenient and useful for all rational
taxpayers.
Vagueness in application of tax law is handy for taxpayers, because
it creates a persistent opportunity for underpayment of taxes. Let us see
why: having indeterminate rules implies that we do not know exactly
what the outcome of the application will be, or which rules should be
applied to a specific case. It implies that small pieces of information
may influence legal results significantly. Indeterminacy may turn the
balance toward those with information advantages. These persons can
create a bias by selectively emphasizing (and even introducing) small
pieces of information that tip the balance toward the legal term that
entails more favorable results.
Taxpayers have a significant and persistent information advantage
over tax authorities. Authorities lack the resources to examine most
economic activity physically or mentally. 147 When a firm produces and
an individual works or consumes, tax authorities are almost never there
to watch. On the rare occasions that they are, they have problems
understanding what is being done and how much it is worth.
Asymmetrically, each taxpayer has a lot of information about his own
activities. The combination of persistent asymmetrical information and
the indeterminacy of tax rules may result in the persistent underpayment
of taxes. (In our discussion of sociolects to follow, we will add to this
the linguistic mechanisms that enable individuals to create even more
opportunities for vagueness).
Here we have shown that an individual taxpayer may profit from
indeterminacy and vague application of tax law. This result is also true
for groups of individuals that participate in a common transaction. This
fact is important to note. It implies that vagueness, and the ensuing tax
avoidance, do not create conflicts of interest between taxpayers. It
implies that taxpayers tend to collaborate against authorities, and will
not cooperate with them. This result is important also because it shows
how unsophisticated taxpayers can indirectly enjoy the fruits of
sophisticated tax avoidance performed by others.

146.
147.

For such a claim, see Miller, supra note 35, at 15.
Maaser Kesafim, The Development of Tax Law, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 153, 199 (2007).
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Now, let us explain how individuals involved in a group transaction
may all profit from vagueness and the ensuing tax avoidance. The
148
explanation is found in the economic theory of tax incidence.
According to this theory, and for most cases, any tax saving is shared by
all parties to a transaction. To understand this we have to pool all profits
from a transaction and note that each party expects (ex ante) to have at
least some positive profit - otherwise he would not agree to
participate. 149 Division of profit - including any marginal gains depends on the relative bargaining powers of the parties. When no one
has all the power, any increase or decrease in the profit pool is likely to
be shared by all participants to some extent. So, if any of the
participants saves on taxes, the increased profits are likely to be
distributed among all of them. This holds - under the said economic
theory - no matter which one has saved taxes in the legal sense.
For example, if an employer can pay his employee in two different
legal manners, and under one of them the employee's tax burden is
lower, the employer will find it profitable to reduce his employee's
taxes. The increased profits will not stay solely in the hands of the
employee, but rather will be shared with the employer, perhaps via a
partial decrease in the before-tax salary. The profit can be shared in a
nonmonetary fashion as well, such as the employer winning the services
of this employee from another employer who cannot offer the tax
savings.
Experience tells us that something handy, useful and persistent will
become widespread. In our case, it implies that many taxpayers will
benefit from vague tax rules. It also tells us that if those taxpayers have
a choice in the matter, they will choose more vagueness rather than less.
Implied in the previous paragraphs one can find two different
definitions (or kinds) of tax avoidance. 150 One, which is the subject of
this paper, deals with the reduction of taxes associated with an activity
or situation. The other refers to situations in which taxes on an activity
are not reduced, but only change legal bearer. This kind of "avoidance"
has to do more with prices paid. by one participant to another and less
with tax avoidance. If authorities receive the same total amount of taxes

148. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, Tax Incidence, in ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
482 (3d ed. W.W. Norton 2000). For a historic view, see R. A. Musgrave, A BriefHistory of Fiscal
Doctrine, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 28-44 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,

Elsevier 1985).
149.

ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW I-

2,4(1979).
150. Supra Part IV.3 ("Tax Avoidance- Legitimacy and Hindsight Advantage").
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and the burden is only shifted from one participant to another, this shift
is the economic equivalent of a change of prices.
VI. ACCELERATED EVOLUTION OF TAx TERMS

VI.1. Control of Tax-Terms: Authorities,Practitioners,or Taxpayers?
After studying, in previous chapters, how tax terms are statically
applied and used, let us now turn to study their control and evolution.
For jurists and for linguists who study general law, it seems evident that
legislators have significant control over the definitions of legal terms after all, they have the legal power to define these terms' 5' (see, for
example, the list of definitions that begins many statutes). This power is
complemented by both judicial interpretation and application, 52 and by
the authoritative making of bylaws, interpretation guidelines and
application policies. To this aim, tax law has the additional power of
recharacterization and reconstruction doctrines, which allow authorities
and courts to rename activities. 53 The existence of these rules and the
emphasis they receive in tax law hint that a control dispute
is present and
54
that authoritative control of definitions is contested.
In previous chapters, we showed that this "law-in-control"
151. "The traditional notion of law as rules cannot readily accommodate the idea that the
contours of the law may shift through no legislative or official act but merely through social
change." Radin, supra note 32, at 809. The context of this citation is Radin's interpretation of
Wittgenstein's approach to rules as social practices. It is interesting to note that according to Radin,
social influence on rules is contradicting the "rule of law." Our thesis reinforces her claim by
analyzing a specific field of law (tax-law), for which this control is significant and disruptive. For a
linguist's acceptance of authoritative legal definition-power, regarding it as a difference between the
historical processes affecting legal-languages and those affecting ordinary ones, see Charrow, et al.,
supra note 42, at 179, 184-86. See also Alice Davison, Linguistic Analysis and the Law, in
LANGUAGE USE AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 235 (Roger W. Shuy & Anna Shnukal eds., 1980).
For the claim that anything left out of legal-sources does not exist for the "legal discourse," see
GREIMAS, supra note 28, at 89-90. For some discussion of Greimas and Landowski's ideas on this
point, and some references and discussion of "the autonomy of the legal lexicon," see JACKSON,
supra note 12, at 33-35, 46-50, 306-08 (concluding that legal lexemes are more definable than their
ordinary language counterparts). For Jackson's association of this defining-authority of legislators
with legal positivism, and for dismissal of the claim that natural-language can impose itself onto
legal-language, see id. at 124-25, 160-61. For more ideas about the control of definitions, see
Walter Probert, Words Conciousness:Law and The Control of Language, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
374, 383-87 (1972).
152. For the claim that courts have the power to define terms, even for the general language,
see Morrison, supra note 42, at 333-34.
153. OROW, supra note 1, at 163-81,329-48.
154. For somewhat similar claims, which deny the dichotomy between rule givers and rule
followers, see Radin, supra note 32, at 814.
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perspective is not as evident as it seems. The legislator's defining power
is limited to reductions that miss much meaning. The applicative powers
of courts and administrative tax authorities are subject to vague
application of language, synonymy, and faulty information, all of which
facilitate avoidance.
In this chapter, we show that private tax practitioners and taxpayers
put pressure on tax terms to change their semantic contents, and that this
pressure is continuous, unusually high, and leads to exceptionally rapid
changes in tax language.
Applying the principles of economic
rationality, we can predict the direction of such changes and show how
they facilitate tax avoidance. Legislative, judicial, and administrative
reactions to the accelerated evolution of tax terms are also considered.
We base our claims on the linguistic perspective, 55 which contradicts
the jurist perception that lawmakers and courts dictate the language of
the law.
From a linguistic point of view, it seems evident that naturallanguage is first and foremost under the control of the speakers. 156 In the
realm of communication, a word acquires the meaning perceived by both
the speaker and listener 157 (it may be almost acceptable for some
branches of private law).1 58 This conversational momentary-supremacy
affects language in general over the long term, so abstract meanings of

155.

Explained in the following text.

156. WUNDERLI, supra note 57, at 19 (quoting R. ENGLER, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURS
DE LINGUISTIQUE GENERALE, EDITION CRITIQUE par R.E., tome 1, Wiesbaden (1968)). For an

interdisciplinary law-and-linguistics analysis, to the same end, see Goodrich, supra note 37, at 529.
Language is sometimes analyzed critically as means of control and power, e.g., GOODRICH, supra
note 37, at 78-79, 86-87, 97-98, 138-42, 150-51, 156-57, 171-76, 179-80, 186-87, 191, 193. For the
claim that a text is both created and interpreted under the ever changing conventions of
communities, see STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 14-17 (1980). For a philosophical approach, considering law to be
subjected to language, see JACKSON, supra note 12, at 25 (quoting M. Villey, "Priface,'
symposium on 'Le Langage du droit', 19 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 1-5).
157. SAUSSURE, supra note 15, at 27-30. See also GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 153-54

("[T]he concept of the subject, if taken seriously or literally, implies a myriad and chaotic world of
unique and free linguistic agents, all equally possessed of the power to join the anarchy of speech.
Within such a problematic, the defining characteristic of meaning (as opposed to linguistic value)
will be that it cannot be systematized to any greater degree than can the notional uses of freedom...
."1).

158. Aharon Barak, The Interpretation of Contracts, in INTERPRETATION IN LAW 74 (2001)
(the following is translated from Hebrew by one of the authors of this paper: "No reason exists to
prevent contracting parties from creating their own language. They can use 'horse' for 'dog' and
'dog' for 'horse."'). For such an example in different context, see BIX, supra note 72, at 21-22.
Glanville Williams, Language and The Law-IV, 61 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 383, 392 (1946)
(stating "[lI]n the case of wills and contracts, evidence is admissible, within certain limits, to show
that words were used in a special meaning that is not their ordinary one.").
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words gradually change according to the general public's usage. 159 On
the other hand, history shows that authority can sometimes affect
linguistic stability or change
- especially by means of compulsory
60
education, or lack thereof. 1
Goodrich already applied such a linguistic approach to law, arguing
against the "autonomy of law."'161 He also argued for multiplicity of
meaning and of meaning creating mechanisms in legal discourse. 162 The
application of these to our research is ambiguous in three ways that help
point to the conclusion of this sub-chapter. First, administrators, judges,
and even legislators "speak" tax terms - maybe not as much as the
multitudes of private-sector taxpayers, accountants and lawyers - but
they still hold authority and their speech has much weight. Second, we
can conclude that the speakers of tax terms are practicing lawyers and
accountants. When they work for administrators or legislators, they take
part in the authoritarian efforts. When active in the private sector, they
have professional and economic obligations to their taxpaying clients.
These obligations transform them into language agents who try to use
and modify tax language to their clients' advantage.
The third aspect of this ambiguity implies that we have to modify
our earlier claim, the claim that legal terms - and implicitly tax terms belong to the sociolect of the law. 163 This claim implied that laypersons
are ignorant about the meaning of this language and may even need
translation. 164 But, as Morrison reminds us, laypersons are both the

159. William Bright, Social Factors in Language Change, in THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIOLINGUISTICS 81, 83 (Florian Coulmas ed., 1997). For a radical version of this claim, in which
the applicability of public conventions to the meaning of signifiers is in the hands of each and every
speaker, see Paul F. Campos, Reflections on the Intersection of Law and Linguistics: This is Not a
Sentence, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 971, 977-78 (1995).
160. Love, supra note 53, at 182-86. For social causes of linguistic change (mostly phonetic
and not semantic change), see WILLIAM LABOV, PRINCIPLES OF LINGUISTIC CHANGE: Volume 2:
Social Factors (2001). For a short discussion of this claim, in relation to phonetic and grammatical
changes (but not semantic ones), see SAUSSURE, supra note 15, at 206-07.
161. GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 533-34 (claiming that such linguistic insights contradict, in
most cases, Hart's theory). For related arguments about "the autonomy of the legal lexicon" and for
the claim that the authoritative qualities of legal language do not "exclude the possibility of
substantial historical influence from ordinary to legal language ... [and may even pose as] .. .an
argument against the principle of autonomy," see JACKSON, supra note 12, at 46-50.
162. GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 187.
163. Supra Part 11.2("Legal Term and its Signified - Rule of Law, Authority or
Communication").
164. For the claim that "tax lawyers act as interpreters of legal language between the
government and the taxpayer," see Friedman, supra note 53, at 571. For some harsh critique of the
function of lawyers as translators, see SOLAN, supra note 10, at 121. For an argument against the
need for translation (and for lay understanding of the law), see Morrison, supra note 42, at 285-86.
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165
customers of lawyers and accountants, and - indirectly - lawmakers.
Laypersons who pay heavy taxes on a regular basis are motivated to
involve their lawyers and accountants significantly in their regular
economic activities. These professionals do not only "translate" the law,
but help their clients apply and even use relevant tax terms. The
laypersons are motivated to elect legislative representatives who use the
language they understand - e.g. general English - and legislate in
English. So, these laypersons take an active role in the tax-language
community by both "speaking" (i.e. using) tax terms based on
professional advice or knowledge and by sending those who sympathize
with them to draft laws in their language. Taxpayers gain some control
over tax terms via these direct and indirect methods. The economic
theory of tax incidence 166 indicates that these informed taxpayers may
earn the sympathy and cooperation of others who share the economic
savings connected to tax planning and avoidance (e.g., employer and
employees).
The conclusion for now is that for matters of tax law, private sector
professionals and laypersons (taxpayers) have a strong incentive to
"speak" tax terms and take part in controlling them.

VI.2. Evidence of the Strugglefor Control
In the last subchapter,1 67 we saw that the construction of some legal
doctrines aimed at enhancing authoritative control over tax terms
indicates that a control struggle exists. More evidence of this 168
can be
found in § 25 of Mertens' treaties of U.S. federal income tax law.
Section 25 deals with the term "business expenses." 169 Taxpayers
70
seek to expand the meaning of this term because it reduces tax burden.
Authorities seek to confine it to its dimensions as prescribed by the
legislator, who bases his decision upon political, social, and economic
considerations.
In Mertens § 25.02, under the heading "case-by-case analysis," we
first learn of the existence of an "inordinate amount of litigation on the
deductibility of business expenses; much of that litigation has not been
productive of new principles or learning." This litigation shows the
165. Morrison, supra note 42, at 319-20.
166. See supra Part V.2 ("Rational Taxpayers May Prefer Indeterminacy and Vague
Application").
167. Supra Part VI. 1 ("Control of Tax-Terms: Authorities, Practitioners, or Taxpayers?").
168. MERTENS, supra note 66, Vol. 6, § 25.
169. Id.
170. E.g., I.R.C. § 162.
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weakness of legal definitional authority. It shows that taxpayers often
find it worthwhile to bear the expenses of litigation over the semantic
contents of a term and to test repeatedly its limits and penumbra.
Economically speaking, "worthwhile" indicates positive expected value
from the litigation, meaning a high probability of success. The claim
that no new principles are produced shows that taxpayers can constantly
present new cases over given terms. "Throughout the litigation is heard
the constantly reiterated judicial warning that each case must be
determined on its own special facts," Mertens adds. This last point
shows that the legislator cannot properly uphold his defining powers in
face of ever-continuing popular semantic pressure.
Sections 25.12 and 25.15 provide an almost formal
acknowledgment of the struggle. One of the conditions for tax
recognition of an expense is its "ordinary" nature. "Ordinary" may be
understood as an economic fact, but it can also be interpreted as a
reference to language. For example, "customs and practices and form of
speech prevailing in the business world of a taxpayer usually furnish
reliable guides in determining whether the particular expense is ordinary
in that business."' 17 1 This struggle has results: "Payment of an expense
may be ordinary at one time and not at another time.' ' 172 We can learn
also that the distinctions relating to the "ordinary" quality of expenses
are of degrees, and not of kinds.1 73 These doctrinal points are
indications of taxpayer control, which can gradually change the semantic
contents of tax legal terms, as is claimed in the coming paragraphs.
VI. 3. Being (Mis)Understood and Accelerated Evolution of Tax Terms
This paper's thesis that rational taxpayers may favor vague
language use does not correlate with motivations in normal language.
For example, if we can express ourselves in this paper either with the
core of one signified or the penumbra of another, we choose the first, so
long as we are aware of these options. We do so because we want to be
understood, 174 and cores are clearer than penumbras. 175 Our individual

171. MERTENS, supra note 66, Vol. 6 § 25.15 (under the heading "Customary to Trade or
Business").
172. Id. at § 25.13.
173. Id.
174.

TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 18-19 (citing M. BRtAL, ESSAI DE StMANTIQUE 314

(1897). See also PERGNIER, supra note 61, at 366-67.
175.

See RICHARD VON MISES, POSITIVISM: A STUDY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 38 (1951).
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desires here are similar to those of many others, and the desire to be
understood influences the evolution of language. 176
When we use language in our capacity as taxpayers, we use tax
terms with cheaper tax consequences more than ones with expensive
consequences. This implies that we avoid - when we can - the semantic
cores of undesirable tax terms, and we almost always avoid their
penumbras. On the other hand, we use both the semantic cores and
penumbras of tax terms that lead to lower taxes as much as we can.
Language is affected by such use. In the short run, language is almost
unchangeable - one can use it incorrectly but cannot change it. 177 In the
78
long run, the signifieds of tax terms are gradually decided by usage1
("long run" varies in length). 179 The continuous use of a term to
describe a specific meaning brings this meaning into the term's core.
Conversely, lack of use can move a meaning from core to penumbra and
from penumbra to oblivion. 180 One implication of this theory is that tax
terms are under continuous and unusually high pressure to change181their
meaning and may be more dynamic than many other word groups.
Please note that we are dealing with semantic changes rather than
phonetic or graphic (including spelling) changes.1 82 Semantic changes
can happen independently from other kinds of change, and they are
183
affected less by 84the change-inhibiting qualities of written language
and written law.
Since changes in meaning stemming from taxpayer influence on
language are aimed at reducing the tax burden, 185 and since tax
authorities seek to collect taxes, the authorities have to react to such
176.

TAMBA-MECZ, supra note 8, at 18-19 (citing M. BREAL, ESSAI DE SEMANTIQUE 107

(1897)); LABOV, supra note 160, at xv.
177. SAUSSURE, supranote 15, at 36, 104-08.
178. SAUSSURE, supra note 15, at 108-13. Words may change meanings in a sudden manner,
through mechanisms such as metaphors and the creation of new ambiguities. See Rico, supra note
6, at 55-56 (citing P. RICcEUR, LA MtTAPHORE VIVE (1975). See also Rico, supra note 6, at 391.
179. SAUSSURE, supra note 15, at 193.
180. WUNDERLI, supra note 57, at 19, 47 (quoting R. ENGLER & FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE,
COURS DE LINGUISTIQUE GENERALE, EDITION CRITIQUE par R.E., tome I, Wiesbaden 1968.); See
Bright, supra note 159, at 81, 83.
181. For the existence of varying change-paces, see generally SAUSSURE, supra note 15, at
193.
182. For long-run semantic changes (and for changes in the legal consequences of legal terms),
see MELLINKOFF, supra note 14, at 325-45.

183. For the general inhibiting effect of written language, see SAUSSURE, supra note 15, at
193-94. As we saw earlier, tax-law relies heavily on written language. Supra Part III ("Tax Base").
184. For a claim about a "freezing" effect of written law, see MALEY, supranote 14, at 21-22.
185. For our earlier discussion of the "business expenses" tax-term, see supra Part VI.2
("Evidence of the Struggle for Control").
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changes. One possible reaction available to tax authorities is using their
defining powers against such changes to constantly reenact tax rules and
subrules (they can also change tax rates and the tax base). Another
possible reaction is holding a continual administrative ad-hoc
interpretive review or judicial review to combat such changes. That is,
rapid changes to the signifieds of legal tax terms that stem from taxpayer
behavior entail frequent redefinition or intensive interpretative review of
these terms by authorities.
This also justifies the use of purposive
1 86
interpretation of tax law.
This special dynamic quality of the signifieds of tax terms gives
reason to characterize them as an accelerated part of language. This
characterization has a general implication for us: it implies that some
linguistic insights may be more significant when applied to signifieds
related to tax law than when applied to language in general.
VI. 4. Rationally DirectedLanguage Evolution - And Good New Tax
Rules
Our results solve abstractly the problem of random' 87 - or semi
random 88 - language evolution in the tax field. 89
Economic
rationality19 ° gives taxpayers a consistent and predictable incentive to
avoid tax terms that lead to more taxes, so one can predict that the
signifieds of such tax terms will grow thinner over time. Conversely, the
signifieds of tax terms desirable to taxpayers will grow semantically
wider. Thus, the signified of "wages" is expected to erode whenever it
"touches" the signified of "business expenses."
Continuing with an example from IV.2 and in accordance with the
incidence theory, 19' some employers may find it rational to define their
employees' duties widely - both in terms of hours and activities - in
order to include things employees would have done anyway in their
spare time. These employers can then report any expenses related to
these "duties" as regular business expenses and not as wages. The
186.

Michael Livingston, PracticalReason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretation of Tax

Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677, 680 (1996); Vern Krishna, Purposive Interpretation as a Weapon
Against Tax Avoidance, 8 CAN. CURR. TAX 9, 9 (1997).
187. WUNDERLI, supra note 57, at 35 (quoting ENGLER & SAUSSURE, supranote 57).
188. Id. at 113; Rico, supra note 57, at 242-46 (discussing the approach of GUSTAVE
GUILLAUME, LANGAGE ET SCIENCE DU LANGAGE (Presses de l'Universitel Laval 1964)).
189. For more and different kinds of language motivation, see Rico, supra note 6.
190. For a different use of economic rationality to predict language evolution, see RUBINSTEIN,
supra note 120.
191. See supra Part V.2 ("Rational Taxpayers May Prefer Indeterminacy and Vague
Application").
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benefit accrued to the employees will not be taxed, and the employers
will pay higher salaries while saving on taxes.
Under this example - which seems to be the case on many
occasions - the signifieds of the words "work," "job" and "expenses"
stretch, and the signifieds of the words "wage," "benefits" and "hobby"
shrink. Under the general claim 92 of this chapter, we can argue that the
service to the interests of
slogan "a good tax is an old tax" does
93
individuals and disservice to the public.1
VI.5. Taxing by Special Tax Terms or by General Legal Terms
Taxes can be levied by legal terms created especially for this
purpose, or by terms with additional functions. 194 For example, the legal
term "personal holding company"'195 was created for tax purposes; the
term "corporation" has multiple uses. The previous parts of this paper
imply a theoretical result related to these two alternatives. This result is
that the signifieds of tax-specific legal terms are expected to change
more rapidly than the signifieds of legal terms used for both tax and nontax purposes. Taxpayers use and need the legal term "corporation" for
many non-tax purposes, such as limiting liability, distributing risk and
trading stocks. All these uses influence and maintain the term's meaning
and downplay the effect of changes stemming from tax considerations.
On the other hand, taxpayers do not seek to use the tax term "personal
96
holding company" and the increased taxes entailed by its application,
so there are no personal interests that prevent them from using any
legitimate tool to avoid it. This implies that nothing hinders the
shrinking effects of avoidance for the signified of this tax-specific legal
term. Please note that tax-specific legal terms, like "charitable
organization,"' 97 may have positive consequences. In that case, nothing
short of authorities' defining powers will slow their growth.
Thus, the signifieds of legal terms created by tax authorities and
used only for communicating with them are expected to suffer much
192. For an even more general claim about the deterioration of certainty in law (and not only in
tax law), see D'Amato, supra note 103, at 5, 18-19, 32-33.
193. For other fields of law, for which language is not subjected to such anti-communicative
mechanisms, proven formulae may be both publicly and privately useful. For such an opinion, see
Charrow et al., supra note 42, at 187. For some contradicting and critical comments on the use of
legal-forms, see MELLINKOFF, supra note 14, at 277-82.
194. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REv. 517, 537-44 (1994); GLIKSBERG, supra note 1, at 9-10.
195. I.R.C. § 542.
196. CORPORATE TAXATION, supra note 66, at 17-18.
197. E.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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abuse.' 98 When these legal terms cause higher tax liability, taxpayers
will avoid them regularly and may eventually drain them of content,
especially when they relate to activities unobserved by authorities.
When these legal terms bring tax benefits, taxpayers will stretch their
limits, making them ever wider.
Similarly, when non-tax legal terms are used for taxation, they
become deformed over time and thus decreasingly useful for their field
of origin. Shrinking or stretching occurs according to tax considerations,
which at the same time damages their non-tax usefulness. That is, tax
avoidance can negatively influence non-tax activities and fields of law.
This disadvantage is both private and public because of the possible
positive welfare effects of non-tax activities that use these legal terms.
For example, the legal term "corporation" is economically useful, 199 and
using it in order to levy taxes interferes with its primary function. So,
the less important it is to raise taxes, relative to other activities, the more
raising taxes should be based on tax-specific legal terms in order to not
interfere with other, more important activities. This thesis may support
the existing double standard, subject to criticism, for the reports of
publicly-traded corporations.2 °0 In this case, separate reports must be
(read: are allowed to be) issued to stock traders and tax authorities. This
separation protects the very important functions of the stock market which requires credible information 20 1 - from the negative effects of taxlaw avoidance.
From tax authorities' perspective, tax-specific legal terms become
less clear and less useful faster than general legal terms with tax
consequences. This is the other part of the disadvantage of the
accelerated evolution of the signifieds of legal terms used for non-tax
purposes. So, the more important the tax is, the more it should be based
on more stable signifieds implied by general legal terms, which support
the application and interpretation of tax law.

198. For a contrary claim that tax-specific terms are clearer than regular-language terms used
for taxation, see Miller, supra note 35, at 36, 37 (arguing that economic incentives may influence
our reading of tax terms).
199. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 410-11 (A2003).
200. Mitchell L. Engler, Corporate Tax Shelters and Narrowing the Book/Tax "Gaap'"2001
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 539, 541-42.
201. For that and for some critique, see POSNER, supra note 199, at 457-58.
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VII. CONVERGENCE RESULTS

VII. 1. Civil Ban on Tax Avoidance - Some Difficulties
We saw earlier20 2 that in order to "cover" reality, legal tax terms
must be partially synonymous - they must overlap - and so some
legitimate tax avoidance must exist. We have seen also that language
evolution can augment such avoidance. 0 3 The purpose of this subchapter is to ask, to what extent should we civilly delegitimize such
avoidance practices? (This paper does not deal with criminal tax law,
nor does it deal with criminal misrepresentations or nondisclosure of
information).2 °4
The theoretical point is that any such prohibition must be based on
overlapping and extendible legal terms. In order to prohibit a set of
language-related activities that we cannot clearly define (because they
use synonymy and language change), we must use semantically
extendible legal terms. These will be extended, after the fact, to cover
avoidances.
205
Our discretionary anti-avoidance tools are the recharacterization,
206
2027208
7 and business purpose
economic substance,
reconstruction,
anti-avoidance rules 20 9 and interpretation 210 and
general
doctrines;
reinterpretation of legal terms when they slip away from reality (or when
taxpayers use other terms that avoid them). These may take effect when
authorities think - sometimes together with courts - that something
incorrect or unfair was done and that wrong legal terms were used
(taxpayers who deviate too much from regular language usage may even
find themselves under criminal evasion sanctions). When this happens,
we subject taxpayers to the civil risk of disputed tax returns, 1 civil
penalties, 212 and, of course, the higher taxes they tried or happened to
202. Supra Part 1V.2 ("Semantics - Accuracy in Taxation is Affected by Semantic Extensions,
Synonymy, and Vagueness of Application").
203. Supra Part VI ("Accelerated Evolution of Tax Terms").
204. For an explanation of the civil penalty structure for taxes, see THURONY1, supra note 1, at
221-22.
205. E.g., OROW, supra note 1, at 329-48.
206. ld. at 163-81.
207. See references, supra note 3.
208. E.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
209. E.g., OROW, supra note 1.
210. OROW, supra note 1, chapter 9; Krishna, supra note 186.
211. E.g., I.R.C. § 6212.
212. E.g., 1.R.C. § 6662 (imposing a 20% penalty). See also THURONYI, supra note 1, at 22122.
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avoid. The distinction drawn here between "tried" and "happened" is
due to difficulties that prevent us and those taxpayers from knowing in
advance whether their use of legal terms will be considered avoidance
afterward. Moreover, if indeed taxpayers change consistently the
meaning of tax-terms in their favor and modify their behavior into the
penumbra of tax-terms with cheaper tax results, these judicial and
regulatory anti-avoidance doctrines must be biased. Not biased by error,
as Zelenak argued about non-literal interpretation,2 13 but biased by
general tendency. If the general tendency is taxpayers' reliance on the
ever evolving language of the law (and on "the rule of law" which relies
on that language), then the corrective doctrines - in order to function must constantly act against the language and rule of law and in favor of
the government. This opposition between the government and the courts
on one side and the rule of law on the other must be constantly tamed,
since the rule of law is a major principle of an enlightened democracy.
This opposition explains some of the problems we face when using antiavoidance methods of interpretation and tax-rules.
Under these anti-avoidance rules, and to the measure .they are
indeterminate, each taxpayer can "buy" lower risk levels by avoiding
cheaper legal terms in favor of those that lead to more expensive results
and paying higher taxes (tax authorities do not sanction over-payment).
It seems that while "setting" the terms of this social deal, we should note
that our anti-avoidance rules suffer the same dubious qualities as the
behavior we are fighting. If we consider the use of ever-changing and
overlapping legal terms for the sake of avoidance as wrong, we may
under the same measure consider the use of ever-changing and difficultto-predict prohibitions by authorities, i.e., prohibitions that contradict to
a certain degree (again) the rule of law.214 Mild enforcement of
indeterminate rules is less prone to injustice than harsh enforcement.

213. For the claimed existence of pro-government judicial bias, in relation to non-literal taxcode interpretation, see Zelenak, supra note 33, at 666-73. Zelenak claimed that courts tend to
deviate from the language of the tax-code if the deviation is for the government. If a deviation is
against the government, the courts tend to stick to the language. Zelenak based this conclusion on a

handful of cases. Zelenak mentioned as outdated the contradictory doctrine of strict tax-law
interpretation favoring taxpayers. Please note that Zelenak does not acknowledge a general
tendency of tax law to evolve in ways that favor tax-payers, according to the "treacherous language"
argument of our paper. Rather, Zelenak seems to find symmetry, both as an equitable end and as an

empirical truth.
214. See OROW, supranote 1, at 246-50.
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VII.2. SociolinguisticExclusion and Public Language Inhibition of
Avoidance
Language diverges between different groups within the society that
uses it. 215 These divergences are called dialects, professional jargons,
and slang, and may all be considered facets of a general linguistic
phenomenon (hereinafter "sociolect"). One motivation behind such
divergence is exclusion: slang, for instance, may exclude others,
216
including parents, members of different interest groups or cops
(exclusion implies selective inclusion). 2 7 This act of exclusion is
facilitated by the arbitrary quality of signs.218 Arbitrary signs imply that
individuals who regularly interact among themselves can create a small
number of private or modified signs that diverge from the general
language. For example, they can associate an utterance or a mark (e.g.,
"business expenses") with a referent that is not customarily associated
with it. As long as they share this association, it is functional for them.
If this unusual association spreads, it may take hold in a sociolect.
Moreover, this is a social, grassroots phenomenon largely outside the
control of legislators.21 9
We can reinterpret the previous claims of this paper about
indeterminacy, language evolution, and vagueness of application in
relation to the sociolinguistic exclusion of tax authorities.
This
reinterpretation indicates that linguistic tax avoidance may be inhibited
by circumstances that oblige taxpayers to use public language. This
language is relatively homogenized, and may be well understood by
authorities. Under these obligations, a taxpayer has less exclusionavoidance opportunities than otherwise. In addition, and continuing the
argument from Part III of this paper, the use of such language for one's
own needs makes the taxpayer's "tax base" more susceptible to
observation by authorities.
Such needs may include the following:
1. The taxpayer may need publicity or cooperation with the public
for his economic activities;

215.

PERGNIER, supra note 61, at 381-86; GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 175-76. For legal

"terms of art" and for legal argot, see MELLINKOFF, supra note 14, at 16-19.

216. PIERRE GUIRAUD, L'ARGOT 5-8 (Presses Universitaires de France 1958); MELLINKOFF,
supranote 14, at 18.
217. For inclusion in the legal professional group as motivation for professional jargon, see
Friedman, supra note 53, at 566-68.
218. WUNDERLI, supra note 57, at 18-19 (distinguishing between unstable spoken language
(parole), and stable written language).
219. Id. (quoting ENGLER & SAUSSURE, supra note 57).
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2. The taxpayer may need state help, like contract enforcement by
courts.
A taxpayer may need to be understood by unfamiliar business
partners or investors with whom he shares only the prevailing public
language. He may be obliged economically, for instance by competitive
pressures: he may be trying to convince customers or would-be partners
that working with him is better for them than working with his
competitors. He may be obliged legally: for example, the "plain English
disclosure rules" demands that information released about publicly
220
traded corporations is understandable by the general trading public,
and thus these corporations must use public language. On the other
hand, a taxpayer may be conducting business with his regular business
partners, with whom he shares particular information not available to
authorities. Together, they do not have to use public language. 221
A taxpayer needs state help if he does not trust his business partners
and believes he is at risk of them breaching a contract, or the like. On
such occasions he may want to use a language understood by courts,
foreseeing a possible appeal for their help. On the other hand, he may
conduct business through real transactions, which do not need future
enforcement; 222 through transactions that overcome opportunistic
motivations; 223 or just by working with trustworthy partners. 224 To the
extent this is possible, public language is not necessary.
As a result of this, public corporations that deal with many parties,
including employees, suppliers and customers, can be taxed under more
accurate (and paradoxically more vague) 225 legal terms than small
businesses. This is so because of their need to use public - and so,
clearer- language. This result comes from "vagueness" considerations.
Other considerations, like such corporations' ability to use tax-

220. Kenneth B. Firtel, Plain English: A Reappraisalof the Intended Audience of Disclosure
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 851, 878-79 (1999).
221. Long term suppliers, clients, business-partners, and family may form "relational
contracts" that arrive to high levels of acquaintance. The extreme case would be "transacting" with
oneself, and indeed "income" from privately-used assets (like a home) is usually left untaxed. J.
Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 157, 173
(1990).
222. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 149, at 3-4.
223. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 505.06 (1990) (explaining
how a person can mathematically overcome opportunistic behavior).
224. The ultimate example of trustworthy partners is the taxpayer himself. This may help to
explain the fact that governments do not tend to tax "profits" made by individually held and used
capital assets like a home. Slemrod, supra note 221, at 173.
225. See supra Part IV.2 ("Semantics - Accuracy in Taxation is Affected by Semantic
Extensions, Synonymy, and Vagueness of Application").

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

45

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 23 [2008], Art. 2

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[23:33

complexity for avoidance, may lead to different results. If vaguenessavoidance is the result of fuzzy reality and indeterminate rules, then
complexity-avoidance can be compared to a chess game: the rules are
very clear, but the taxpayer who can plan five moves ahead will beat
authorities who can plan only four moves ahead. Public corporations
can hire skilled tax advisors who place them many moves ahead (this
kind of planning is not the subject of this paper).
VIII. CONCLUSION

This paper showed that contrary to other fields of law, constancy of
legal texts does not bring clarity or stability of meaning to tax law.226
Indeed, the graphic signs that comprise the legislative, administrative
and judicial rules may be stable, but their semantic contents are
constantly changed and abused. This result is augmented by the fact,
claimed in Chapter III of this paper, that the "tax base" is not exclusively
economic, but also linguistic. Tax policy makers and administrators face
a treacherous language 227 with negative mechanisms, each of which
leads separately to vagueness, synonymy and ambiguity. This result
explains also the unusual difficulties tax practitioners and jurists
encounter when trying to read and understand tax law sources - and the
doubly large difficulties taxpayers face.22 8 It explains and justifies the

226. For the opposing claim, see MALEY, supra note 14, at 21-22, 28 (stating, "Despite the
care, or the best intentions, of their drafters, sections written for certainty can become just as
uncertain as those written for flexibility. Every case of statutory interpretation which comes before
a court is an instance of uncertainty: it may be ambiguous, vague, absurd, or in conflict with other
rules.").
227. For discussion and critique of "precision" in legal language, see MELLINKOFF, supra note
14, at 290-398.
228. Weisbach, supra note 1; Roberts et al., supra note 93; Bethany K. Dumas, Book Review,
52 TENN. L. REv. 351, 352-53 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD A. WESTIN, LEXICON OF TAX
TERMINOLOGY (1985)). For a passing remark about a minus 15 score of the Internal Revenue Code

in a readability test (i.e., more difficult than "very difficult"), see Uriel Procaccia, Readable
InsurancePolicies:JudicialRegulation and Interpretation, 14 ISR. LAW REV. 74, 77 (1979). These
difficulties have additional reasons that are good for all fields of law - for an interdisciplinary
positivistic perspective, see Danet, Language and the Law, supra note 42, at 539-40; Danet,
Language and Process, supra note 33, at 541-46 (discussing possible reasons for the unusual
qualities of legal language). For a critical perspective, see GOODRICH, supra note 37, at 205-06.
After quoting the definition of "income" from the GERMAN MANUAL OF FISCAL LAW, Baldinger
writes: "I am perfectly happy if you understand none of that, because I cannot understand it in
German either." Supra, note 72, at 45. For the claim that laypersons' difficulties in understanding
tax law is due to their lacking knowledge about the tax-language-system, see JACKSON, supra note
12, at 47-48 (quoting Baldinger).
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need for continuing authoritative and judicial interpretation, creative
application, and reinterpretation in tax law.229
This paper not only explained many problems of tax law and its
application, but also showed that they are, and can be, subject to some
remedies. So let us retrieve some of its positive and remedial policy
implications: moderation in accuracy is a desirable end for tax law
because it reduces the implications of the accuracy-synonymy paradox
(see IV.2), pragmatic indeterminacy (IV.5) and its related theoretical
problems (IV.4 and IV.6); tax avoidance, by means of language, is
regressive and should be compensated for by progressive taxation
(IV.3); the choice between taxing via non-tax legal terminology or via
tax terms is significant, and should be made according to the relative
importance of the non-tax and tax activities (VI.6); tax legal terms
change meaning in ways that facilitate avoidance, such that constant
updating of legislation, regulations and judicial doctrine is a justifiable
necessity for tax law (VI); the legitimacy of general anti-avoidance rules
and their likes (including interpretive doctrines with similar ends) is
comparable to the legitimacy of tax avoidance (VII.1); and public
corporations can be taxed under more accurate legal terms than other
taxpayers (VII.2).

229. Achievable through the generous use of interpretative doctrines like "non-literal,"
"purpose," "intent," "economic substance," "policy," and the authority to "recharacterize" tax
events. See references to such doctrines throughout this paper. For a contradicting opinion, see
Coverdale, supra note 143; D'Amato, supra note 60, at 581-83 (reversing his arguments soon after).
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